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It's Not Broken, So Don't Fix It: The
International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards System and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty
DAVID SLOSS*

INTRODUCTION

On May 11, 1995, parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT or Treaty)' convened at the NPT Extension Conference and
decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely.3 Prior to the Extension

Conference, several commentators had urged the conferees to
strengthen the NPT.4 Many observers claimed that the Intema* M.P.P. 1983, Harvard University;, B.A. 1981, Hampshire College; J.D. expected 1996,
Stanford University. Mr. Sloss has served as Director of the Nuclear Safeguards and
Technology Division in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), in which he had broad responsibility for United States government efforts to
improve the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. During his nine year
career at ACDA, Mr. Sloss also helped formulate and negotiate the verification provisions
of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
The author wishes to thank John Barton, George Bunn, Tony Perez and Terence Taylor
for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968,21 U.S.T. 483,729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT].
2. The NPT provides for a conference to be convened twenty-five years after entry into
force of the Treaty "to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or
shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." Id. art. X, para. 2,21 U.S.T. at
493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. The Treaty-mandated conference, or the "NPT Extension
Conference," convened in New York City on April 17, 1995. William Epstein, Indefinite
Extension-With Increased Accountability, Bull. Am. Scientists, July/Aug. 1995, at 27.
3. Barbara Crosette, Treaty Aimed at Halting Spread of Nuclear Weapons Extended,
N.Y. Times, May 12, 1995, at Al.
4. See, e.g., William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty:
A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 Va. J. Int'l L 735 (1993). For a critique of the
Epstein & Szasz article, see Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, NPT Extension: A Reply, 34 Va. J.
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tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency)5 safeguards sys-

tem, the central mechanism for verifying states' compliance with
their NPT obligations, especially needed reinforcement. 6
Concerns about weaknesses in the IAEA safeguards system

became acute in the summer of 1991, when international inspectors, operating under the authority of a U.N. Security Council resolution,7 discovered that Iraq had been conducting a clandestine

nuclear weapons program.

This was particularly disturbing

because the IAEA had been applying NPT safeguards 9 in Iraq for
two decades. 10 Critics cited the IAEA's failure to discover Iraq's
Int'l L. 247 (1993). Other commentators also suggested strengthening the Treaty during
the NPT Extension Conference. See, e.g., Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International
Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 749 (1994); Susan Carmody, Note,
Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations have the
Right to Inspect North Korea's Nuclear Facilities?, 18 Fordham Int'l L. J. 229 (1994);
Bryan L. Sutter, Note, The Nonproliferation Treaty and the "New World Order," 26 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 181 (1993).
5. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the international organization
charged with safeguarding nuclear materials to help verify states' compliance with their
NPT obligations. NPT, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at
172. For further discussion of the IAEA role under the NPT, see infra notes 23-50 and
accompanying text.
6. See infra note 11.
7. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)
[hereinafter Resolution 687]. For further discussion of inspections in Iraq under U.N.
Security Council resolutions, see infra notes 219-232 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 105.
9. The IAEA had applied safeguards in Iraq prior to entry into force of the NPT under
the pre-NPT safeguards system. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as provisionally
extended in 1966 and 1968), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (Sept. 16, 1968). For further
discussion of the pre-NPT safeguards system, see infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
The current NPT safeguards system is contained in a separate document. The Structure
and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 (June
1972) [hereinafter INFCIRC/153]. For a detailed discussion of INFCIRC/153, see infra
notes 65-93 and accompanying text. This Article uses the terms "NPT safeguards" and
"INFCIRC153 safeguards" to refer to IAEA safeguards carried out in accordance with
NPT article III and INFCIRC/153 respectively.
10. Iraq has been a Party to the NPT since the Treaty entered into force in 1970. NPT,
supra note 1 (listing parties to the NPT treaty), 729 U.N.T.S. at 169. The IAEA has
applied NPT safeguards in Iraq since 1973. See Agreement Between Iraq and the Agency
for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/172 (Feb. 22, 1973) [hereinafter INFCIRC/
172]. With respect to IAEA safeguards, the most disturbing aspect of revelations about
Iraq's nuclear program was that much of Iraq's nuclear weapons development work had
been conducted at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. Leonard Spector, Nuclear
Proliferation in the Middle East, 36 Orbis 181, 182 (1992) [hereinafter Spector 1]. Portions
of the Tuwaitha facility had been subject to IAEA safeguards for many years under
INFCIRC172. Burrus M. Carnahan, Note, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 842 1994-1995

1995]

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

nuclear weapons program as evidence of a fundamental flaw in the

IAEA safeguards system." Others believed that this oversight
indicated that the IAEA could safeguard declared nuclear activi-

ties effectively,
but was ill-equipped to detect undeclared nuclear
12
activities.

Since the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, the
IAEA has taken several steps to enhance the NPT safeguards system, including improving its capability to detect undeclared nuclear
Attack: Prospects After the Gulf War, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 524, 524-25 (1992). The fact that
Iraq was able to carry out elements of a clandestine nuclear weapons program virtually
under the nose of IAEA inspectors exposed serious weaknesses in the IAEA safeguards
system. Spector 1, supra, at 185.
11. For critical views of IAEA safeguards, see, e.g., Jennifer Scarlott, Nuclear
Proliferation After the Cold War, 8 World Pol'y J. 687, 689-94 (1991); Stephen Budiansky,
The Nuclear Epidemic, U.S. News & World Rep., March 16, 1992, at 40; George J. Church,
How to Hide an A-bomb, lime, July 8. 1991. at 40; Patrick Glynn, Bombs Away: The
Nuclear Proliferation Boom, New Republic, Oct. 28, 1991, at 13; Gary Milhollin, The Iraqi
Bomb, New Yorker, Feb. 1, 1993, at 47; Leonard Weiss, Tighten up on Nuclear Cheaters,
Bull. Atom. Scientists, May 1991, at 11. One nuclear nonproliferation expert argued that
problems with the IAEA were so intractable that authority to conduct NPT safeguards
should be transferred from the IAEA to the U.N. Security CounciL Paul L Leventhal,
Why Bother Plugging Export Leaks?, 36 Orbis 167, 177 (1992). For more favorable views
of IAEA safeguards, see, e.g., Anthony Fainberg, Strengthening IAEA Safeguards:
Lessons from Iraq (1993); David Fischer et al., A New Nuclear Triad: The NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Verification and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (1992) [hereinafter New Nuclear Triad]; Leonard Spector, Repentant
Nuclear Proliferants, 88 Foreign Pol'y 21 (1992) [hereinafter Spector 2]; Bill Monahan,
Note, Giving the Non-Proliferation Treaty Teeth: Strengthening the Special Inspection
Procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 33 Va. J. Int'l L 161 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Fainberg, supra note 11, at 3-8; Monahan, supra note 11, at 162. In the
broadest sense, arms control verification regimes require inspection agencies to perform
two types of missions: confirming the veracity of declarations about declared treatyrelevant activities, and detecting undeclared treaty-relevant activities. Most arms control
agreements which provide for on-site inspection distinguish between sites declared by the
inspected state to be a locus of treaty-relevant activity (declared sites) and sites which are
not declared by the inspected state (undeclared sites). See, e.g., START Inspection
Protocol, infra note 178, arts. VII (addressing inspections of declared sites), VIII
(addressing "Suspect-site inspections"); Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Inspection
Protocol, infra note 183, sec. VII (concerning "Declared Site Inspection"), VIII
(concerning "Challenge Inspections within Specified Areas"); Chemical Weapons
Convention Verification Annex, infra note 190, pts. X (providing challenge inspections of
undeclared sites), VI-IX (addressing inspections of declared sites). The problem of
undeclared activities and the problem of undeclared sites are not coterminous: it is possible
for a state to conduct undeclared activities at a declared site. Thus, a comprehensive
account of IAEA safeguards would address the IAEA's legal authority to inspect: a)
declared nuclear activities at declared sites; b) undeclared nuclear activities at undeclared
sites; and c) undeclared nuclear activities at undeclared sites. This Article focuses
primarily on the IAEA's legal authority to investigate possible undeclared nuclear
activities at undeclared sites.
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 843 1994-1995
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activities.13 Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom remains that
the NPT does not afford the IAEA the legal authority to conduct
the kinds of highly intrusive searches permitted under other arms
control agreements concluded during the past decade. As one
commentator wrote: "[T]reaties reflect the time when they were
14
At the time the NPT model safeguards agreement
negotiated ....
was written, intrusive verification measures were politically unacceptable ... 15
Notwithstanding the pressure for significant revision of the NPT,
parties to the treaty took only modest steps at the Extension Conference' 6 to strengthen the overall NPT regime. 17 Indeed, rather
13. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
14. The phrase "NPT model safeguards agreement" refers to INFCIRC/153. See supra
note 9.
15. Jessica Eve Stern, Co-operative Security and the CWC: A Comparison of the
Chemical and Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regimes, Contemp. Security Pol'y, Dec.
1994, at 30, 32.
16. The NPT Extension Conference adopted four final documents. Epstein, supra note
2, at 28. Those documents were: Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/L.6 (May 11, 1995) (deciding that "the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely"); Strengthening the Review Process for the
Treaty, IAEA Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/L.4, (May 11, 1995) (agreeing on measures to
strengthen the treaty review process provided in NPT article VIII(3)); Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, IAEA Doc. NPT/
CONF.1995/L.5 (May 11, 1995) (adopting a set of principles and objectives to achieve the
IAEA's purposes); Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution, IAEA Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/
L.8, (May 11, 1995) (endorsing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction).
17. The terms "NPT regime" and "nuclear nonproliferation regime" are commonly used
to refer to a set of formal and informal international arrangements designed to curb the
spread of nuclear weapons. See Scarlott, supra note 11, at 689; Carmody, supra note 4, at
230-31. Aside from the NPT itself, there are three formal multilateral treaties that are
central to the nuclear nonproliferation regime: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,
Aug. 6, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1440 (1985) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1986);
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature Mar. 3,
1980, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979); Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S, 281
[hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco].
The IAEA safeguards system is another key element of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. Informal agreements among nuclear supplier states govern the export of nuclear
and nuclear-related equipment and materials. See Communications Received from
Members Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of
Equipment and Other Material ("Trigger List"), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/209 (Sept. 3, 1974)
(and subsequent revisions); Communications Received from Certain Member States
Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment or Technology,
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254 (Feb. 1978) (and subsequent revisions). INFCIRC/209 enacted
the so-called "Zangger Committee" guidelines, which implemented NPT article 111(2);
INFCIRC/254 includes the so-called "Nuclear Suppliers Group" guidelines. Barry
Kellman, Bridling the International Trade of Catastrophic Weaponry, 43 Am. U.L. Rev.
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 844 1994-1995
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than significantly revising it, they endorsed the existing IAEA safe-

guards system.'

Did the NPT parties squander an opportunity to

enhance IAEA safeguards at the Extension Conference, or is the

IAEA safeguards system more robust than its critics maintain?
This Article contends that, contrary to the conventional wisdom,
the IAEA's legal authority to investigate suspicious activities at

undeclared sites in NPT non-nuclear-weapon states 9 is in certain
respects more substantial than that vested in any other inspection

agency under any other international arms control agreement.
Indeed, the NPT is the only arms control agreement in which inter-

national inspectors have the right to inspect undeclared sites without the inspected state having any 20legal right to limit inspectors'
access within such undeclared sites.

Part One of this Article introduces key background information
about the NPT and the IAEA. Part Two interprets the textual

basis of the IAEA's legal authority to inspect undeclared sites
under existing NPT safeguards agreements. 1 Part Two argues that
755, 806-08 (1994). Finally, governments around the world are involved on a daily basis in
a wide range of diplomatic, intelligence gathering and other activities designed to curb the
risk of nuclear proliferation, all of which are part of the global nuclear nonproliferation
regime. For an overview of the current nuclear nonproliferation regime, see Richard L
Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime to
Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 Cornell Int'l LJ.71, 117-22 (1995).
18. The Conference affirmed that "[t]he International Atomic Energy Agency is the
competent authority responsible to verify and ensure ... compliance with its safeguards
agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under article
III 1 of the Treaty ....Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the Agency
in this regard." NPT/CONF.1995/L.5, supra note 16, para. 9. The Conference also
endorsed efforts by the IAEA Board of Governors "aimed at further strengthening the
effectiveness of Agency safeguards." Id. at para. 11.
19. The NFT distinguishes between "nuclear-weapon states" and "non-nuclear-weapon
states." The Treaty defines a nuclear-weapon state as one "which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967."
NFT, supra note 1, art. IX, para. 3, 21 U.S.T. at 492-93, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174. Under this
definition, the five nuclear-weapon states are: the United States, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (now Russia), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, France, and the People's Republic of China. George Bunn & John B.
Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union, 33 Va. J.Int'l L
323, 334-35 (1993). All other parties to the Treaty are non-nuclear-weapon states. Id.
20. The IAEA's broad right of access to undeclared sites arises only if the IAEA Board
of Governors determines that such access is "essential and urgent." INFCIRCI153, supra
note 9, para. 18; see infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
21. The NFT requires non-nuclear-weapon state parties to negotiate bilateral safeguards
agreements with the IAEA. NPT,supra note 1, art. III, para. 4, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729
U.N.T.S. at 172. Such agreements, "NPT safeguards agreements," or "INFCIRC153-type
safeguards agreements," are modeled on INFCIRC153. These formal bilateral safeguards
agreements between the IAEA and NPT parties, together with a variety of more informal
IAEA safeguards documents, comprise the NPT safeguards system. See supra note 17.
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 845 1994-1995
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the IAEA has the legal authority to conduct whatever investigative
activities the IAEA Board of Governors deems necessary to satisfy
itself that NPT non-nuclear-weapon states have not concealed
undeclared nuclear material or diverted declared nuclear material
from ostensibly peaceful uses to use in nuclear explosives.
Part Three discusses IAEA safeguards implementation in North
Korea from 1992-1994. The analysis serves two purposes. First,
analysis of the practice of safeguards implementation in North
Korea supports the legal interpretation that the IAEA has the
authority to conduct whatever investigative activities the IAEA
Board deems necessary to satisfy itself that states have not concealed undeclared nuclear material or diverted declared nuclear
material. Second, the analysis highlights the practical limitations
on the IAEA's enforcement authority, as distinct from its investigative authority.
Part Four compares the IAEA's investigative authority to the
investigative authority vested in other inspection agencies under
other international arms control agreements. Notwithstanding the
conventional wisdom that the NPT verification regime is relatively
nonintrusive, this Article contends that the IAEA's legal authority
to investigate suspicious activities at undeclared sites in NPT nonnuclear-weapon states is, in certain respects, farther reaching than
the legal authority to inspect undeclared sites vested in any other
inspection agency under any other international arms control
agreement. Part Four also concludes that the NPT procedures for
initiating inspections of undeclared sites are rather cumbersome in
comparison with the procedures in the Chemical Weapons Convention, 22 and it offers some suggestions for modest improvements in
those procedures.
Part Five discusses two important practical constraints on the
IAEA's investigative authority: limitations on the IAEA's ability
to obtain information about which undeclared sites to inspect, and
restrictions on the IAEA's ability to enforce states' compliance
with a demand to inspect an undeclared site.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE

NPT

AND THE

IAEA

Under the NPT, each non-nuclear-weapon state party undertakes not to "manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
22. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 21, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter CWC].
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 846 1994-1995
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other nuclear explosive devices." 23 In addition, non-nuclearweapon state parties promise to

accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be
negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the

International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's
safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verifica-

tion of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under
this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear

energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.24

Thus, the NPT assigned to the IAEA,2 an international organiza-

tion that exists independently from the NPT, substantial responsibility for verifying the "fulfillment" of states' NPT obligations not
to acquire nuclear explosive devices.

Before entry into force of the NPT, the IAEA maintained a safeguards system? which still applies to states that are not parties to
the NPT,27 such as India and Pakistan. However, reference in NPT
article III(1) to "the Agency's safeguards system" was not intended

to mandate the application of the pre-NPT safeguards system in
NPT states. Rather, "a new system of safeguards, parallel to the
existing one, had to be devised in order to establish uniform rules
23. NPIT, supra note 1, art. 11, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
24. NPT, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
25. The IAEA was created by the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
July 29, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter JAEA Statute]. The Statute
assigned the IAEA a dual mission: to promote the development of atomic energy, and to
help ensure "that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or
control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." Id., art. 11, 8 U.S.T. at
1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 4. To enable the Agency to execute the latter mission, the IAEA
Statute authorized the Agency to "apply safeguards" to nuclear materials in conjunction
with Agency projects, or otherwise at the request of one or more states. Id., art. III, para.
A(5), 8 U.S.T. at 1095,276 U.N.T.S. at 6; art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1105-08, 276 U.N.T.S. at 2630. The IAEA Statute has been amended three times since it entered into force in 1957.
IAEA Statute, supra note 25, at 1. The most recent amendment was in 1989. Id. The
IAEA has published a revised version of the Statute that incorporates all amendments
through 1989. References to the IAEA Statute throughout this Article are based on the
1989 revised version. The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA "in accordance with the Statute" of the IAEA. NPT,
supra note 1, art. III, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
26. The pre-NPT IAEA safeguards system is codified in IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66,
supra note 9.
27. David Fischer & Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Approach 16-17
(Jozef Goldblat ed., 1985) (discussing the KANUPP safeguards controversy).
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 847 1994-1995
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applicable to the States Party to the NPT ...."-8 Thus, there are

really two IAEA safeguards systems: the one that pre-existed the
NPT, which applies in states not party to the NPT, and a second
after the NPT entered into force that applies to
system developed
29
parties.
NPT
By adhering to the NPT, a non-nuclear-weapon state agrees that

the terms of the safeguards agreement it concludes with the IAEA
will be governed not only by the NPT, but also by the Statute of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA Statute or the
Statute).3 ° The Statute allocates authority between the General

Conference, the Board of Governors, and the staff, naming the
Director General as the "chief administrative officer of the
Agency. "31 The General Conference consists of representatives of
all member states. The Statute explicitly assigns to the General
Conference responsibility for a limited number of matters, such as
electing members of the Board of Governors, approving amendments to the statute and approving the appointment of the Director General. 32 Beyond that, the General Conference "may discuss
any questions or any matters within the scope of this Statute...
and may make recommendations.., to the Board of Governors."33
The General Conference, however, does not have the authority to
make decisions on matters other than those specified in the

statute.34
The chief decision-making body in the IAEA is the Board of

Governors. The Board of Governors has broad responsibility for
managing the organization. The Statute provides that "[t]he Board

of Governors shall have authority to carry out the functions of the

28. 2 Mohamed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and
Implementation, 1959-1979, at 679 (1980).
29. There are also a few states not party to the NPT where the IAEA applies INFCIRC/
153-type safeguards. For example, Brazil is not a party to the NPT but is a party to the
Treaty of Tlatelolco. David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Stick: Linking
Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 993, 1018-19
nn.105 & 108 (1991). Under the Treaty of 'latelolco, Brazil is obligated to accept
safeguards that, for all practical purposes, are equivalent to NPT safeguards under
INFCIRC/153. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 17, art. 13, 22 U.S.T. at 772, 634 U.N.T.S.
at 358.
30. The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude a safeguards agreement
with the IAEA "in accordance with the Statute" of the IAEA. NPT, supra note 1, art. Ii,
para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
31. IAEA Statute, supra note 25, art. VII, para. A, 8 U.S.T. at 1101, 276 U.N.T.S. at 16.
32. Id. art. V, para. E, 8 U.S.T. at 1098-99, 276 U.N.T.S. at 12.
33. Id. art. V, para. D, 8 U.S.T. at 1098, 276 U.N.T.S. at 10-12.
34. Id.
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 848 1994-1995
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Agency in accordance with this Statute, subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference as provided in this Statute. ' 3 5 The

Board of Governors makes most decisions on the basis of a simple
majority of those present and voting.36 The Board currently con-

sists of representatives of thirty-five states, thirty of whom are NPT
parties and five of whom are not.37 By assigning safeguards
responsibilities to the IAEA, the NPT created a structure in which
decisions related to safeguards implementation that potentially
affect all NPT parties are made by a body that operates by majority

vote, excludes many NPT parties, and includes some states that are
not NPT parties.
The text of the NPT defines only in very general terms the substantive content of NPT safeguards agreements to be negotiated
between the IAEA and NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. The
Treaty provides:
Procedures for the safeguards required by this article
shall be followed with respect to source or special fission-

able material whether it is being produced, processed or
used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such

facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be
applied on all source or special fissionable material in all

peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such
State, under its38 jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
35. Id. art. VI, para. F, 8 U.S.T. at 1100, 276 U.N.T.S. at 16.
36. Id. art. VI, para. E, 8 U.S.T. at 1100, 276 U.N.T.S. at 16. Decisions on the Agency's
budget require a two-thirds majority. Id. A majority of the Board has the authority to
decide that other matters, as well, will require a two-thirds majority. Id.
37. NPT Parties who are current IAEA Board members are: Argentina, Australia.
Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia,
Ireland, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Spain,
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and
Uruguay. States, Members of the Board of Governors (1994-95), provided by IAEA
Public Affairs Office (on file with author). Board members who are not NPT Parties are:
Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, India and Pakistan. Id.; Fischer & Szasz, supra note 27, at 88-94;
Alexander T. Lennon, The 1995 NPT Extension Conference, Wash. 0., Autumn 1994, at
205, 209-210.
38. NPT, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 488,729 U.N.T.S. at 172. The terms
"source material" and "special fissionable material" are defined in article XX of the IAEA
Statute. Both terms refer to nuclear material. Roughly speaking, the term "source
material" refers to uranium and thorium as those materials occur in nature. IAEA Statute,
supra note 25, art. XX, 8 U.S.T. at 1112, 276 U.N.T.S. at 38. These materials are not
directly useable in nuclear weapons. Perez, supra note 4, at 755 n.21. The term "special
fissionable material" refers to materials that do not occur in nature: uranium that has been
isotopically altered and plutonium that has been produced in a nuclear reactor. IAEA
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Apart from these two sentences, the text of the NPT offers very
little guidance to the IAEA concerning the content of safeguards
agreements to be negotiated with NPT non-nuclear-weapon
states.39 Those who adopt a narrow view of the IAEA's legal
authority to inspect undeclared sites under the NPT have focused

on two words in the preceding quotation: "material" and "peaceful." They emphasize that since the NPT authorizes the IAEA to
safeguard "material" not "facilities," the IAEA is precluded from

inspecting nuclear-related facilities where there is no evidence of
the presence of nuclear material.4 ° They also interpret the phrase
'41
"peaceful nuclear activities"
any military installation. 2

to bar the IAEA from inspecting

Some commentators who have adopted a broader view of the
IAEA's legal authority to inspect undeclared sites under the NPT
have attempted to defend that broader interpretation by a close
reading of the text and the negotiating history of the NPT.4 3 However, the text and negotiating history of the NPT, without more,
Statute, supra note 25, art. XX. Some, but not all, "special fissionable material" is directly
useable in nuclear weapons. Williamson, supra note 17, at 81 n.30.
39. Article 111(3) establishes a general requirement to implement safeguards so as "to
avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities." NPT , supra note 1,
art. III, para. 3, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. Article 111(4) establishes timelines
for negotiation of safeguards agreements. Id. art. III, para. 4. 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729
U.N.T.S. at 172. In addition, there are two preambular paragraphs related to safeguards.
Id. at pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 484-85, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169-70.
40. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 15, at 35-36 (arguing that the IAEA lacks the authority
under the NPT to conduct inspections of nuclear weapons production activities that do not
involve nuclear materials). For a response to this argument, see infra note 95.
41. NPT, supra note 1, art. III., para. 3., 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
42. When the IAEA sought to inspect undeclared sites in North Korea. the North
Koreans claimed that the sites were military installations, and therefore off limits to IAEA
inspectors. See Statement of the DPRK Government (Mar. 12, 1993), reprinted in Letter
Dated 12 March 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 2, 3, U.N. Doc. S/25407 (1993) [hereinafter
Statement of DPRK Government]; see also Carmody, supra note 4, at 254. For a response
to this argument, see infra note 140. For a more detailed exposition of North Korea's legal
position, see Carmody, supra note 4, at 260-62.
43. See, e.g., George Bunn, Does the NPT Require its Non-Nuclear-Weapon Parties to
Permit Inspection by the IAEA of Nuclear Activities That Have Not Been Reported to the
IAEA?, in New Nuclear Triad, supra note 11, Annex, at 44, 45-47 (arguing that the word
"peaceful" in NPT article III does not impose any significant limitation on the IAEA's
legal authority); George Bunn & Roland M. Timerbaev, Nuclear Verification Under the
NPT: What Should it Cover-How Far May it Go? 9-15 (1994) (arguing that, despite the
NPT's emphasis on nuclear material, the IAEA has the authority to inspect steps toward
development of nuclear weapons that do not involve nuclear material).
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cannot justify a broad view of the IAEA's legal authority to inspect
undeclared sites. Indeed, the negotiating history indicates that the
parties intended to defer debate about the scope of the IAEA's
legal authority until after the Treaty was signed. ' 4
The safeguards provisions now embodied in NPT article III were
the product of a delicate political compromise among the Soviet
Union, the United States and U.S. European Allies. The United
States wanted some safeguards provision in the NPT; the Europeans already had a regional safeguards system, established pursuant
to the EURATOM Treaty,45 and did not want to accept additional
IAEA safeguards; and the Soviets, who had no faith in
EURATOM safeguards, insisted that the NPT should provide for
IAEA safeguards or no safeguards at all.46 The eventual compromise led to inclusion of an "agreement to agree" 47 in the text of the
NPT requiring parties to conclude agreements with the IAEA
"either individually or together with other States, 43 with the
understanding that the precise scope of the IAEA's legal authority
would be worked out in the context of negotiating those
agreements.49
NPT parties implemented this treaty provision by negotiating
with the IAEA a model NPT safeguards agreement, approved by
the IAEA Board of Governors, which has become the basis for
negotiation of all subsequent bilateral NPT safeguards agreements
between the IAEA and NPT non-nuclear-weapon states.50 Thus,
this model NPT safeguards agreement has become the primary
source for defining the scope of the IAEA's legal authority to
inspect undeclared sites under the NPT.5 1
44. See Bunn & imerbaev, supra note 43, at 9-11.
45. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM),
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
46. See George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the
Russians 87-103 (1992); Fischer & Szasz, supra note 27. at 70-71.
47. Bunn, supra note 46, at 95.
48. NPT, supra note 1, art. HI, para. 4,21 U.S.T. at 489,729 U.N.T.S. at 172. The phrase
"together with other States" referred to the existence of EURATOM. the regional
European safeguards organization. This formulation allowed EURATOM member states

to fulfill their safeguards obligations by means of a single safeguards agreement between

EURATOM and the IAEA, rather than requiring each EURATOM member state to
negotiate a separate safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Bunn, supra note 46, at 95.
49. Bunn, supra note 46, at 95.

50. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
51. INFCIRC/153, supra notes 9, 14.
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LEGAL AUTHORITY UNDER NPT SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENTS

The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970.52 Three weeks
later, the IAEA Board of Governors established "a Safeguards

Committee 'to advice [sic] the Board as a matter of urgency on the
Agency's responsibilities in relation to safeguards in connection
with the Treaty, and in particular on the content of the agreements
which will be required in connection with the Treaty.' ,,53 The com-

mittee met three times between June, 1970 and March, 1971, and
more than fifty countries were represented.5 4 In April, 1971, the
IAEA Board approved a model NPT safeguards agreement based
on the committee's recommendations. 55 That document is known
as INFCIRC/153.

6

INFCIRC/153 consists of 116 numbered

paragraphs that translate the general rights and obligations embodied in NPT article III into a set of much more specific practices and
procedures to 5be
followed by the IAEA and NPT non-nuclear7
weapon states.
A.

The Legal Effect of INFCIRC/153 on States' Safeguards
Obligations Under the NPT
INFCIRC/153 is a unique international legal document. It

serves as a model for an international enforcement regime but it
cannot properly be referred to as an international agreement since
no state ever signed it. Nevertheless, INFCIRC/153 specifies the
substantive terms to be included in all safeguards agreements pursuant to NPT article III between the IAEA and NPT non-nuclearweapon states.5 8 As of December 31, 1993, the IAEA had entered
into eighty-eight such agreements with one hundred NPT non52. NPT, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. at 483, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169.
53. Shaker, supra note 28, at 659 (quoting R. Rometsch, Development of the JAEA
Safeguards System for NPT, Invited Review Paper, in 9 Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy:
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic
Energy, at 385, 386-87, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.49/P770, U.N. Sales No. 72.IX.9 (1972)).
54. Id.
55. Fischer & Szasz, supra note 27, at 23.
56. INFCIRC/153, supra note 9.
57. For a detailed description of the content of INFCIRC153, see infra notes 65-93 and
accompanying text.
58. INFCIRC/153, supra note 9 ("The Board of Governors has requested the Director
General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating
safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.").
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nuclear-weapon states.5 9 Since the NPT entered into force, every
bilateral safeguards agreement concluded between the IAEA and

NPT non-nuclear-weapon states has been substantially identical to
INFCIRC/153. 60
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 61 provides that

treaty interpretation shall take into account "[a]ny subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."' - In light of
twenty years of consistent practice in which NPT safeguards agreements have conformed to INFCIRC/153, the IAEA could not now
conclude an NPT safeguards agreement that did not conform.
Thus, the fact that every safeguards agreement between the IAEA
and an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state is substantially identical to
INFCIRC/153 constitutes "subsequent practice in the application

of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties"63 that
non-nuclear-weapon states acceding to the NPT today are legally
obligated to conclude safeguards agreements that conform not only
59. The Annual Report for 1993, IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVII)2 (July 1994). The number
of states (100) is greater than the number of agreements (88). largely because a single
agreement with EURATOM covers several states. See supra note 48. In addition, the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia created other cases where a single
agreement governs more than one state.
60. Except for safeguards agreements with EURATOM and Japan, every safeguards
agreement between the IAEA and NPT non-nuclear-weapon states tracks the language of
INFCIRC/153, virtually word-for-word. Fischer & Szasz, supra note 27, at 90. The IAEA
safeguards agreements with EURATOM and Japan also follow the INFCIRC/153 model
but with some slight variations. See id. at 70-73. The variations in the EURATOM
agreement arose because EURATOM is a regional safeguards organization that existed
prior to entry into force of the NPT. The variations in the Japan agreement result from
Japan's insistence on similar treatment with EURATOM. Id. at 73. Despite these
variations, the IAEA's safeguards agreements with EURATOM and Japan are
substantially identical to INFCIRC153. See id. at 70-73.
61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
62. Id. art. 31, para. (3)(b). The proper scope of article 31(3)(b) has been a subject of
much debate among legal scholars. See, e.g., Gyirgy Haraszti, Some Fundamental
Problems of the Law of Treaties 140-42 (J6zsef Decs4nyi trans., 1973); Maria Frankowska,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 Va. J. Int'l
L. 281, 341-52 (1988); Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation:
with Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna
Diplomatic Conference, 18 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 318, 331 (1969) (suggesting that the
predecessor to the present article 31(3)(b) should be construed to provide context and
avoid excessive literalism in the interpretation of treaties). See generally I.M. Sinclair, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 69-76 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the purposes of
articles 31 and 32 generally).
63. Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31, para. (3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
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to the general obligations of NPT article III, but also to the specific
provisions of INFCIRC/153. 64
B. The Content of INFCIRC/153
65
1. Overview

The central obligation an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state undertakes in an NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA is to accept

safeguards "on all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction
or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose
of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. ' 66 In light of the requirement
that safeguards are to be applied to "all ... material in all ...
activities, '67 the stipulation that safeguards are to be applied for
'68
the purpose of "verifying that such material is not diverted
should be understood to encompass two distinct concepts: the

IAEA must verify that declared nuclear material is not diverted to
nuclear explosive uses, and it must verify that states are not concealing undeclared nuclear material.69
In addition to imposing an obligation on states to accept safeguards, INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements also provide
that the IAEA has both a "right and obligation to ensure that safe64. Legal scholars who view the scope of article 31(3)(b) narrowly might not accept this
conclusion. For a relatively narrow view of 31(3)(b), see, e.g., Frankowska, supra note 62,
at 346.
65. What follows is a very brief summary of the central provisions of INFCIRC/153. For
a more complete discussion of IAEA safeguards, see generally Fischer & Szasz, supra note
27 (providing a description and appraisal of the IAEA safeguards regime); Lawrence
Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (1987)
(discussing the origin, development and challenges of the IAEA).
66. INFCIRC/153, supra note 9, para. 1. The language in INFCIRC/153, paragraph 1 is
virtually identical to the language in NPT article III(1).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. At the recent NPT Extension Conference, the NPT Parties affirmed that IAEA
safeguards should be designed to perform both of these tasks.
[T]he Conference considers that the implementation of comprehensive
safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the
Agency of the correctness and completeness of a State's declaration, so that there
is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared
activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in accordance with
article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.
Report of the Main Committee II, IAEA Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/l, para. 6-15 (May
5, 1995). Although this language was not included in the conference's final documents, its
inclusion without brackets in the final report of Main Committee II indicates that all Parties participating in that Committee concurred with the language.
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guards will be applied.., on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State
....

"70

The IAEA's obligation to ensure that safeguards are

applied on all nuclear material reinforces the interpretation that
the IAEA must verify nonconcealment of undeclared nuclear
material, as well as nondiversion of declared nuclear material.
The detailed provisions specifying how safeguards are to be
applied can be divided into three categories: record-keeping
requirements, reporting requirements and inspection provisions.
States are required to establish and maintain detailed records, to
include both accounting records covering "all nuclearmaterial subject to safeguards under the Agreement" and operating records
covering all facilities "containing such nuclear material"71 States
are also required to provide the IAEA detailed reports. Within
thirty days after the last day of the calendar month in which the
safeguards agreement enters into force, the state must provide the
IAEA an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards, including the types and quantities of nuclear material at
each location where such material is present.72 The initial report
must be updated periodically to enable the IAEA to maintain an
accurate and up-to-date accounting of the types and quantities of
nuclear material at each location where safeguarded material is
present.73
INFCIRC/153 provides for the IAEA to conduct three types of
inspections: routine inspections, ad hoc inspections and special
inspections. INFCIRC/153 included the inspections provision to
confirm, inter alia, "that reports are consistent with records" and
"the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear
material subject to safeguards under the Agreement." 74 Routine
inspections cannot commence until the state and the IAEA have
agreed on "Subsidiary Arrangements." 75 Subsidiary arrangements
are detailed agreements between the state and the IAEA that
specify, for each facility subject to routine inspections, "how the
70. INFCIRC153, supra note 9, para. 2 (emphasis added).
71. Id. para. 54. (emphasis added).
72. Id. paras. 59-69.
73. I d. paras. 63-67.
74. Id. para. 72.
75. Access during routine inspections is limited to "strategic points" specified in the
Subsidiary Arrangements. Id. para. 76. Thus, until the "strategic points" are identified,

there is no access for routine inspections. Prior to commencement of routine inspections,
inspectors may have access during ad hoc inspections "to any location where the initial
report... indicate[s] that nuclear material is present." Id.
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procedures laid down in the Agreement are to be applied. ' 76 The
purposes of ad hoc inspections include the confirmation of information contained in the initial report and the verification of inventory changes after the initial report and prior to the
commencement of routine inspections."
2.

Special Inspections

INFCIRC/153 provides that the Agency may make special
inspections "[i]f the Agency considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the
Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement. '78 The
chief responsibilities referred to here are the Agency's responsibilities to verify that the state has not concealed undeclared nuclear
material or diverted declared nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes. 79 During special inspections, the IAEA may obtain

access, in agreement with the state, to locations other than those
declared by the state to contain nuclear material.80 Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access is to be resolved by
referring the dispute to the Board, and then, if necessary, to an
arbitral tribunal.8 '
INFCIRC/153 enables the IAEA to bypass the arbitral tribunal
if the Board of Governors determines that action by the state "is
essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear
material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."' ' If the
Board makes such a finding, it "shall be able to call upon the State
to take the required action without delay,"8 3 without waiting for a
decision from the arbitral tribunal.
In sum, INFCIRC/153 provides a clear procedure for undertaking special inspections. First, the IAEA has a right to request special inspections of locations other than those declared by the state
to contain nuclear material. Second, ordinarily, the state's concur76. Id. para. 39.
77. Id. para. 71.
78. Id. para. 73(b).
79. See supra note 69.
80. INFCIRC/153, supra note 9, para. 77.
81. Id. paras. 21, 22, 77. Decisions of the arbitral tribunal are binding on both parties.
Id. para. 22.
82. Id. paras. 18, 77.
83. Id. para. 18.
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 856 1994-1995

1995]

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

rence is required for the IAEA to gain access to such locations;
however, if the state refuses to grant access, the dispute is to be
referred to the Board, and then to an arbitral tribunal. Third, if the
Board determines that the need for access to an undeclared location is "essential and urgent," then the Board may bypass the arbitral tribunal and "call upon" the state to grant access "without

delay.' ')

4

This procedure notwithstanding, an important question

remains: is a state legally obligated to grant access to an undeclared

location once the Board "calls upon" the state to do so?
The answer to this question can be found by analyzing
paragraphs 18 and 19 of INFCIRC/153, together with article
XII(C) of the IAEA Statute. Article XII(C) of the Statute authorizes the IAEA Board to make a finding that a state is in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.85 If the
Board finds noncompliance, the state has no recourse; the Board's
judgment is final.16 Paragraph 18 of INFCIRC/153 gives the Board

authority to decide that a particular "action by the State is essential
and urgent" to enable the Agency to verify non-diversion.87 Paragraph 19 connects paragraph 18 to article XII(C), specifying that
the Agency's inability to verify nondiversion is a sufficient condi-

tion for the Board to reach a finding of noncompliance.88
84. Id.
85. The Statute provides that
[t]he staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of.. .determining
whether there is compliance with... the agreement between the Agency and the
State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the
Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of
Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy
forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred.
IAEA Statute, supra note 25, art. XII, para. C. 8 U.S.T. at 1107-08,276 U.N.T.S. at 28-30.
(emphasis added).
86. Article XII(C) authorizes the Board to report noncompliance to all IAEA member
states and the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. Id. The Statute does not
accord member states any right to appeal a Board finding of noncompliance to any other
international body. Moreover, the Board may implement a variety of sanctions on its own
authority without the concurrence of the IAEA General Conference, or of the U.N.
Security Council or General Assembly. Id.
87. INFCIRC153 paragraph 18 provides that
if the Board ...decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order
to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the
Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action without
delay ....
INFCIRC153, supra note 9, para. 18.
88. INFCIRC/153 provides that
if the Board ...finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no
diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to
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This linkage between findings of noncompliance and verification

of nondiversion is critical. In effect, paragraph 19 provides that if
the Board determines that the Agency is unable to verify nondiver-

sion,89 that determination, by itself, authorizes the Board to make a
legal judgment that a state has failed to comply with its safeguards
obligations. This is logically equivalent to a statement that the
state is legally obligated to take whatever action the Board determines is "essential and urgent" to enable the Agency to verify non-

diversion. 90 If the Board determines that access to a particular

undeclared location is "essential and urgent" to enable the Agency

to verify non-diversion, the state is legally obligated to grant
Agency inspectors access to that location, even to an undeclared
site that the state claims is completely non-nuclear. 91 INFCIRC/

153 imposes no limit on the Board's authority to determine what
state actions are essential and urgent to enable the Agency to ver-

ify nondiversion. 92 If, hypothetically, the Board determined that
access to a specific room within a building was "essential and

urgent" to enable the Agency to verify non-diversion, the state
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports
provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take,
where applicable the other measures provided for in that paragraph.
INFCIRC/153, supra note 9, para. 19. The "reports" referred to here are reports of noncompliance. The "other measures" are sanctions, which include suspending a noncomplying member from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership. IAEA Statute,
supra note 25, art. XII, para. C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107-08, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28-30.
89. The phrase "verify non-diversion," as used here, refers to verifying both that
declared nuclear material is not diverted, and that undeclared nuclear material is not
concealed. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
90. Analytically, the first statement takes the form: "If no verification, then violation of
obligation." That statement is derived from paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 and article
XII(C). The second statement takes the form: "If necessary for verification, then
necessary to fulfill obligation." The two are logically equivalent. A third proposition flows
from these two: once the Board makes a finding that access is "essential and urgent," the
inspected state has no right to refuse inspectors access. In arms control jargon, there is no
"right of refusal." For an analysis of the right of refusal in other arms control agreements,
see infra part IV.
91. The IAEA Statute says that Agency inspectors "shall have access at all times to all
places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials,
equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary
. . . to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in
furtherance of any military purpose." IAEA Statute, supra note 25, art. XII, para. A(6), 8
U.S.T. at 1106-07, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28. (emphasis added).
92. Although the Board's authority is not legally circumscribed, politics restrain its
authority because each representative to the Board of Governors knows that Board actions
authorizing highly intrusive inspections in one country's territory set a precedent for future
intrusive inspections in the representative's own country.
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would be legally obligated to grant Agency inspectors access to

that room.93
This provision is extraordinary. There are eighty-eight safeguards agreements between the LAEA and NPT non-nuclear-

weapon states that are modeled on INFCIRC/153. 94 Every one of
those agreements includes provisions that, in the final analysis,

make the IAEA Board of Governors the sole judge of what states
must do to comply with their NPT safeguards obligations. 95 It is as
if, in a contract between two parties, the contract expressly provided that any disputes between the two parties would be resolved

by one of the parties, sitting as arbitrator. No other international
legal instrument, except the United Nations Charter, entrusts the
93. Inasmuch as the IAEA Board has the legal authority to determine that access to any
location is essential and urgent, not only does the inspected state have no right to refuse
access, but it has no right to limit access either. For example, consider a hypothetical site X
in country Y. Site X has 12 buildings. The IAEA Board has the legal authority to pass a
resolution specifying that it is essential and urgent for country Y to grant inspectors access
to a specific room inside a specific building in site X. If the Board passed such a resolution,
country Y would be obligated to grant inspectors access to that room. Indeed, this is
essentially what happened in North Korea. See infra notes 131 and 138 and accompanying
text.
Thus, not only does the inspected state lack a "right of refusal," (i.e., a right to refuse
access to site A), the inspected state also lacks a right to limit access within site X. The
IAEA's legal authority under the NPT to gain unlimited access within an undeclared site (if
the Board passes a suitable resolution) is unmatched by any other inspection agency under
any other arms control agreement. For a comparison to other arms control agreements,
see infra part IV.
94. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
95. As noted above, those who adopt a narrow view of the IAEA's legal authority
highlight the fact that the IAEA safeguards material, not facilities. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text. It is true that the IAEA Board's extraordinary authority under
paragraphs 18 and 19 is triggered only by a finding that the Agency is unable to verify that
there has been no diversion of nuclear material. Thus, one could argue, if the Board had
information indicating that an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state was conducting experiments
involving the non-nuclear components of a nuclear explosive device, but there was no
evidence to suggest that the state had diverted declared nuclear material, or concealed
undeclared nuclear material, then the Board could not make the requisite findings under
paragraphs 18 and 19.
Compelling evidence that an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state was conducting
experiments involving the non-nuclear components of a nuclear explosive device, however,
would itself give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the state might have diverted or
concealed nuclear material. That reasonable suspicion, in turn, could justify an Agency
request for a special inspection under paragraph 73, which permits a special inspection "[i]f
the Agency considers that information made available by the State ...is not adequate for
the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement." INFCIRC/153, supra note
9, para. 73. If the state refused an Agency request to inspect the site associated with the
alleged non-nuclear experiments, the Board might reasonably conclude that such an
inspection was "essential and urgent" to verify non-diversion, thus triggering the IAEA's
extraordinary authority under paragraphs 18 and 19.
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governing body of an international organization with comparable
96
authority.
It could be argued that this broad interpretation of IAEA
authority under NPT safeguards agreements is unwarranted. Such
arguments would rely on the relative ambiguity of the text and
questions about the commitment of the original parties to vesting
the IAEA with such expansive investigative authority. However,
the practice of safeguards implementation in North Korea supports
a broader interpretation.97 Moreover, IAEA Director General
Blix has interpreted the IAEA's investigative powers under
INFCIRC/153 broadly and asserted its right to conduct special
inspections where it has
reasons to believe that there are either installations or
nuclear material which should have been declared but
have not been declared. [The Director General] can, first,
ask for explanations. If the explanations are unsatisfactory, [the Director General] can demand that a special
inspection be carried out at this site.
Also in the case that the country denied us access for a
special inspection and it is turned down, or the state is
dragging their [sic] feet, we would also report to the
Board. And the Board would regard it... as a violation
of the safeguards agreement and it would be immediately
submitted to the Security Council. 98
Director General Blix confirms that if the IAEA demands a special
inspection of an undeclared site, the state has no legal right to
refuse the IAEA access. Such a refusal would violate the safeguards agreement. 99
96. One organization that arguably comes close to having this type of authority is the
Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). See infra notes 189-218
and accompanying text for a comparison of the OPCW and the IAEA.
97. See infra part III for discussion of safeguards implementation in North Korea.
98. North Korea Nuclear Program: Joint Briefing Before the Subcomms. on Arms
Control, International Security and Science; Asian and Pacific Affairs; and International
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
11, 13 (July 22, 1992) (testimony of Dr. Hans Blix, Director General, IAEA) (emphasis
added)[hereinafter Blix testimony].
99. Although the Director General has claimed explicitly that the inspected state has no
right of refusal, he has not, to the best of this author's knowledge, taken the logical next
step and asserted that the inspected state has no right to limit access within an undeclared
site. The former claim implies the latter. If a Board finding that access is "essential and
urgent" overrides a state's otherwise sovereign right to refuse access to a facility on its
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In sum, the NPT grants the IAEA far-reaching authority to conduct whatever investigative activities it deems necessary to verify
that NPT non-nuclear-weapon states have not concealed
undeclared nuclear material or diverted declared nuclear material.
This investigative authority includes a right to inspect undeclared
sites without the inspected state having any legal right to limit
inspectors' access within such sites. This interpretation is supported by the text of INFCIRC/153, statements by the Director
General, and, as discussed below, subsequent practice of the IAEA
in applying safeguards in North Korea.
III.

APPLICATION OF

IAEA

SAFEGUARDS IN NORTH KOREA

This Section examines the practical application of the IAEA's
legal authority, with particular emphasis on the implementation of
IAEA safeguards in North Korea in 1992-94. The central conclusion is that the practice of IAEA safeguards in North Korea supports the preceding legal analysis of the IAEA's broad
investigative authority. Despite the IAEA's broad investigative
authority, though, there are significant constraints on its enforcement powers.
A. HistoricalBackground
Since 1971, when the IAEA Board of Governors approved
INFCIRC/153, all safeguards agreements concluded between the
IAEA and NPT non-nuclear-weapon states pursuant to NPT article III have provided for special inspections. However, until 1993
the IAEA had never formally requested a special inspection at an
undeclared site. 00 The IAEA's underutilization of its special
inspection authority was one element of a broader pattern. Prior
to 1990, the IAEA tended to view its role in implementing NPT
safeguards agreements in a limited fashion: it would confirm
states' reports on declared nuclear material, but did not actively
attempt to verify that states were not concealing undeclared
nuclear material. 0 1
territory, then that finding necessarily overrides a right to limit access as well because there
is no legal constraint on the Board's authority to specify the particular location to which
access is essential and urgent. See supra note 93.
100. Ben Sanders, IAEA Safeguards: A Short H-istorical Background, in New Nuclear
Triad, supra note 11, at 1, 10.
101. There are a variety of reasons why the IAEA did not exercise its legal authority to
the fullest. The IAEA, like other international organizations, serves the collective will of
states who are members of the organization. During the 1970s and 1980s. IAEA member
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Beginning in 1990, several factors contributed. to the IAEA's

adoption of a more activist approach to the problem of undeclared
nuclear material, in general, and the exercise of its special inspection authority, in particular. First, the 1990 NPT Review Conference10 2 "urge[d] the Agency not to hesitate to take full advantage
of its rights, including the use of special inspections as outlined in
paragraphs 73 and 77 of INFCIRC/153." 0 3 Then, in 1991, the
IAEA and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM),

operating under the authority of U.N. Security Council Resolution
687,101 began
to uncover evidence of clandestine Iraqi nuclear
05
activities.'

Revelations from the Iraqi inspections were significant in two
respects. First, Iraq had been a party to the NPT since its entry
into force in 1970 and had been subject to IAEA inspections under
states, for the most part, did not want the IAEA to conduct intrusive inspections in NPT
non-nuclear-weapon states. During this period, the states raising the greatest proliferation
concern, India, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, were not parties to the NPT, and were
not subject to NPT safeguards. Fischer & Szasz, supra note 27, at 19. In contrast, parties
to the NPT,who were subject to NPT safeguards, were generally viewed as "good guys,"
and intrusive inspections of their nuclear programs was generally believed to be
unwarranted. More recently, concerns have arisen about NPT parties, such as Iraq and
North Korea. For a discussion of these developments, see infra notes 112-44, 219-32 and
accompanying text. This has led to increased demands for the IAEA to conduct more
intrusive inspections in NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. For more detailed discussion of
the IAEA's pre-1990 approach to safeguards implementation, see Sanders, supra note 100;
see also Fischer & Szasz, supra note 27.
102. The NPT provides for a conference of NPT parties to be held every five years "to
review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." NPT, supra note 1, art.
VIII, para. 3, 21 U.S.T. at 492, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174. The 1990 conference was the fourth
such conference to take place since the Treaty entered into force in 1970.
103. NPT Conference Doc. NPT/CONF.IV/DC1/Add.3(A), para. 28, reprinted in
Fourth NPT Review Conference, IAEA Doc. GC(XXXIV)/INF/291 (Sept. 19, 1990). For
reasons unrelated to safeguards, the 1990 NPT Review Conference did not adopt a final
declaration. Mark Hibbs, Failure of Accord on Document Clouds NPT Review Process,
Nucleonics Wk., May 18, 1995, at 9. Thus, the language cited was not formally adopted by
the Conference but reflects the recommendation of a drafting committee.
104. Resolution 687, supra note 7.
105. To build a nuclear weapon, it is necessary to produce sufficient quantities of either
plutonium (produced in a nuclear reactor) or highly enriched uranium (produced in a
uranium enrichment plant). See Kellman, supra note 17, at 759-60. Iraq was actively
pursuing the uranium enrichment route. When inspectors discovered Iraq's clandestine
nuclear weapons program, Iraq had apparently not produced enough highly enriched
uranium to make a nuclear weapon. However, Iraq-unbeknownst to the outside worldhad made significant progress toward completing an industrial-scale uranium enrichment
facility. Once completed, this facility might have enabled Iraq to build a nuclear weapon
within as little as two years. Spector 1, supra note 10, at 182. For more on U.N. inspections
and the Iraqi nuclear program, see Milhollin, supra note 11; Fainberg, supra note 11, at 918.
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an NPT safeguards agreement since 1973.106 Thus, the revelation

that Iraq had been conducting clandestine nuclear-weapons related
activities in the presence of an NPT safeguards agreement exposed
the weaknesses of the IAEA's past approach to safeguards implementation. 10 7 Second, the Iraqi experience helped persuade the

international community that a more aggressive approach to seeking out undeclared nuclear materials was both possible and necessary for deterring future NPT violations.Y0s

In response to these pressures, in 1991 the IAEA began to consider a number of possible measures for enhancing implementation

of NPT safeguards, including renewed emphasis on special inspec-

tions. 109 After studies conducted by the IAEA Secretariat, and
deliberations by the Board of Governors, the IAEA Board, in February 1992, "reaffirmed the Agency's right to undertake special

inspections in Member States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements, when necessary and appropriate."110 This statement
affirmed that the IAEA already had authority under INFCIRC/153
106. INFCIRC172, supra note 10.
107. The impact of Iraqi inspections in exposing the weaknesses of IAEA safeguards has
been discussed extensively by several commentators. See, e.g., Lawrence Scheinman, The
Current Status of IAEA Safeguards, in New Nuclear Triad, supra note 11, at 14; Fainberg,
supra note 11; Monahan, supra note 11, at 162.
108. In the wake of revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, commentators
recommended strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. See, e.g., Fainberg, supra note
11; Spector 2, supra note 11; Monahan, supra note 11, at 188-95.
109. Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards
System: A Report by the Director General, IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVIII)117, at 1 (Aug. 29,
1994) [hereinafter 1994 Director General's Report]; see also Scheinman, supra note 107, at
15-16. The principal IAEA effort to improve safeguards has been "Program 93+2," which
consists of a set of seven interrelated tasks designed to strengthen the IAEA safeguards
system and to improve the cost-effectiveness of safeguards. The seven tasks are: 1)"Cost
analysis of present safeguards implementation"; 2) "Assessment of potential cost saving
measures"; 3) "Environmental monitoring techniques for safeguards application"; 4)
"Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system through strengthening
measures and increased co-operation with State Systems for Accounting and Control"; 5)
"Improved analysis of information on States' nuclear activities"; 6) "Enhanced safeguards
training"; and 7) "Proposal for strengthening and improving the efficiency of the
safeguards system". 1994 Director General's Report, supra. at 4. For a detailed account of
Program 93+2, see id; see also Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the
Efficiency of the Safeguards System: Report by the Director General to the General
Conference, IAEA Doc. GC(39)117, at 3-6 (Aug. 22, 1995) (discussing the progress of
Program 93+2 since the 1994 General Conference) [hereinafter 1995 Director General's
Report]. For further discussion of measures, other than special inspections, that the IAEA
has adopted to strengthen the safeguards system, see infra notes 193, 195, and 234; notes
240-243 and accompanying text.
110. IAEA Board of Governors Strengthens Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Regime,
IAEA Press Release PR 92/12 (Feb. 26, 1992) [hereinafter PR 92/12] (on file with author).
See also Michael Z. Wise, Nuclear Agency Reasserts Inspection Rights; IAEA Issues
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safeguards agreements to conduct special inspections. However,
the IAEA Board statement also indicated that special inspections
could be used in support of a broader IAEA mission: to move
beyond mere confirmation of states' reports of declared nuclear
material to independent investigations to help ensure that states
are not concealing undeclared nuclear materials."' Only months
after the issuance of this statement on special inspections by the
Board of Governors, North Korea presented the IAEA its first
opportunity to test its resolve and its ability to exercise its authority to conduct special inspections.
B.

Safeguards Implementation in the DPRK in 1992-93

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) ratified
the NPT in 1985.112 At that time, the DPRK had a small nuclear
research reactor, supplied by the Soviet Union, which was subject
to IAEA safeguards" 3 under a facility-specific safeguards agreement. 114 In 1985, the DPRK was not viewed as a significant
nuclear proliferation threat. 1 5 However, even before acceding to
the NPT the DPRK had probably begun building a much larger,
indigenously developed 5 MW(e) nuclear reactor 16 that began
Statement in Bid to Forestall Further Breaches of Non-Proliferation Treaty, Wash. Post,
Feb. 26, 1992, at A33.
111. The Board Statement declares that special inspections could be used "to ensure
that all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities are under safeguards." PR 92/12,
supra note 110 (emphasis added).
112. Leonard S. Spector, with Jacqueline R. Smith. Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990, at 118 (1990) [hereinafter Nuclear Ambitions].
113. Id. at 139.
114. The IAEA applies safeguards to a number of nuclear facilities around the world in
states that are not parties to the NPT. Scheinman, supra note 65, at 129. Whereas
safeguards arrangements in NPT non-nuclear-weapon states under INFCIRC/153 are
countrywide, safeguards arrangements in non-NPT states are facility specific and generally
depend upon a requirement imposed by the exporting country to apply IAEA safeguards.
Id. at 132-42. Guidelines for such facility-specific safeguards are contained in INFCIRC
66. INFCIRCV66, supra note 9. For a comparison of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 safeguards with
INFCIRC/153 safeguards, see Fischer & Szasz, supra note 27, at 75-86; Sanders, supra note
100; Scheinman, supra note 65, at 153-54.
115. Serious questions did not emerge until the late 1980s. Nuclear Ambitions, supra
note 112, at 127-30.
116. The power of a nuclear reactor may be measured either in megawatts of electrical
power, MW(e), or in megawatts of thermal power, MW(th). For any given type of nuclear
reactor, there is a direct, proportional relationship between the thermal power of the
reactor and the amount of plutonium it can produce. David Albright et al., World
Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1992, 30 (1993) ("Given an
understanding of the relationships between thermal output and the fissioning of uranium
and plutonium, it became possible to calculate past arisings of plutonium with considerable
accuracy."); see also id. at 71-72. The DPRK's 5 MW(e) reactor, also referred to as a 30
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operating in about 1987.117 Moreover, in the mid-1980s, the DPRK
began work on a fairly large reprocessing plant.118 The 5 MW(e)

reactor, together with the reprocessing plant, raised concerns that
the DPRK was seeking a capability to produce plutonium for use
in nuclear weapons. 119
The NPT required the DPRK to initiate negotiation of a safe-

guards agreement with the IAEA "not later than the date" of
depositing its instrument of ratification and to bring that safeguards agreement into force within eighteen months after initiating

negotiations.120 Although the DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985,
the required safeguards agreement did not enter into force until
April 10, 1992.121 Neither the 5 MW(e) reactor nor the reproces-

sing plant was subject to facility-specific IAEA safeguards prior to
entry into force of the NPT safeguards agreement. Thus, from the
time the NPT safeguards agreement entered into force, the IAEA

was concerned with verifying the past production of these two
facilities to provide assurance that North Korea was not concealing
any undeclared plutonium.122

On May 4, 1992, the DPRK provided the IAEA its initial report

on nuclear material subject to safeguards. 123 Shortly thereafter, the

MW(th) reactor, when operating at full power, can produce annually enough plutonium for
approximately one nuclear weapon. Nuclear Ambitions, supra note 112, at 128.
117. Nuclear Ambitions, supra note 112, at 123.
118. Id. at 124. A reprocessing plant is a facility used to extract plutonium from nuclear
fuel after the fuel has been removed from a nuclear reactor. The DPRK refers to this
facility as a "radio-chemical laboratory" and denies that it is a reprocessing plant. Blix
testimony, supra note 98, at 9. However, the IAEA has said that the facility, if completed
and functioning, would properly be termed a reprocessing plant. Blix testimony, supra
note 98, at 9.
119. Nuclear Ambitions, supra note 112, at 124, 128.
120. NPT, supra note 1, art. I1,para. 4,21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
121. Agreement of 30 January 1992 Between the Government of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403 (May 1992) (entered into force Apr. 10,
1992) [hereinafter INFCIRC/403].
122. Blix testimony, supra note 98, at 6-8.
123. Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on
Behalf of the Board of Governors to the Security Council and to the General Assembly of
the United Nations on the Non-Compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
with the Agreement Between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC403) and on the Agency's Inability to Verify the Nondiversion of Material Required to be Safeguarded, reprinted in Report of the International
Atomic Energy Agency: Compliance with Arms Limitation and Disarmament
Agreements: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Appendix, at 3, 4,
U.N. Doc. A/481133 (S125556) (1993) [hereinafter DPRK Report].
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IAEA began conducting ad hoc inspections "to verify the correct-

ness of the information contained in the Initial Report and to

assess its completeness.'1 24 Between May, 1992 and January, 1993,
the IAEA conducted six ad hoc inspections in the DPRK. During

those inspections, inconsistences began to emerge between the
information provided by the DPRK and the independent findings
of the IAEA inspectors. 1' The IAEA repeatedly pressed the
DPRK to clarify these inconsistencies. 126 In the absence of such

clarification, the IAEA concluded that
the Agency could not exclude the possibility that material
from either the IRT Research Reactor or the 5 MW(e)
Experimental Power Reactor had been reprocessed but
not declared to the IAEA. In the light of this, the pres-

ence in the DPRK of additional plutonium-grams
or
27

kilograms-could not be precluded.
In other words, the IAEA was concerned that the DPRK might

have concealed some plutonium, perhaps enough for a nuclear
weapon.1'
The IAEA determined that the inconsistencies could potentially
be rectified if the DPRK would grant IAEA inspectors access to
two sites that the DPRK characterized as non-nuclear military sites
'12 9
but that the IAEA believed were "related to nuclear waste.'
Initially, the IAEA sought an informal agreement to permit access
to these sites.130 However, on February 9, 1993, after the DPRK
repeatedly refused to grant the IAEA access to the two sites, the
31
IAEA Director General formally requested a special inspection.'
124. Id. at 4. In IAEA jargon, "verify the correctness" refers to verifying non-diversion
of declared nuclear material; "assess its completeness" refers to verifying that the DPRK
was not concealing undeclared nuclear material.
125. DPRK Report, supra note 123, at 4-6.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id. at 6. The "IRT Research Reactor" referred to in this quotation is the small,
Soviet-supplied research reactor.
128. The precise amount of plutonium needed to make a nuclear weapon is classified.
The IAEA considers eight kilograms of plutonium to be a "significant quantity." David
Fischer, Innovations in IAEA Safeguards to Meet the Challenges of the 1990s, in New
Nuclear Triad, supra note 11, at 27, 39. However, it is generally conceded that it is possible
to make a nuclear weapon with less than eight kilograms. Id.
129. DPRK Report, supra note 123, at 5-7.
130. Id. at 5-6.
131. Id. at 6-7. One of the sites designated in the Director General's request for a
special inspection was a site IAEA inspectors had visited previously that "initially
appeared to be a one-story building under military control." Id. at 5. However, the IAEA
later learned that the building had a below-ground level as well. The special inspection
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The DPRK responded by sending a delegation to Vienna to meet

with the IAEA, but their discussions failed to produce satisfactory

results. 132
In an effort to obtain greater cooperation from the DPRK, the
IAEA Board adopted a resolution on February 25, 1993 in which it
called upon the DPRK "to respond positively and without delay to
the Director General's request of February 9, 1993 for access to
additional information and two additional sites. '1 33 The Board

also determined that access to the additional information and the
two additional sites was "essential and urgent... to ensure verification of compliance"' 134 with the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement. In response to this Board resolution, and to other actions
that the DPRK perceived as hostile, the DPRK announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT. 135 On March 31, 1993, the Director General reported to the IAEA Board that the DPRK
continues to be in non-compliance with Articles 18, 73, 77
.. of the Safeguards Agreement. This is because it continues to deny access both to the additional information
and locations requested by the Director General on 9
February 1993 and determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to ensure verification of compliance with
INFCIRC/403 .... As a result, the Agency is unable to
verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material
request was directed at gaining access to the below-ground level. Id. at 5-7. Thus, the
notion that the IAEA has the legal right to insist on access to a specific area within a
building is not merely hypothetical. See supra notes 93 and 99 and accompanying text; see
also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
132. DPRK Report, supra note 123, at 7.
133. Report on the Implementation of the Agreement Between the Agency and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doe. GOV2636
(Feb. 25, 1993), reprinted in DPRK Report, supra note 123, Annex 3, at 52. 53.
134. Id. Although the Board resolution did not specifically cite article 18 of the DPRKIAEA safeguards agreement, the resolution used language drawn from article 18. "Article
18" of the DPRK-IAEA safeguards agreement corresponds to "paragraph 18" of
INFCIRC/153.
135. See Statement of the DPRK Government, supra note 42. at 4. The NPT requires
parties to notify other NPT parties and the Security Council three months in advance of
any decision to withdraw from the Treaty. NPT, supra note 1, art. X, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at
493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. Thus, North Korea's announced decision to withdraw from the
NPT, in legal terms, was a three month advance notification. Before the withdrawal
decision became effective, though, North Korea "suspended" its withdrawal. See infra
note 143 and accompanying text. For an extended discussion of North Korea's withdrawal
decision, as it relates to IAEA safeguards, see Perez, supra note 4, at 762-74.
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required to be safeguarded under the Agreement
to
136
devices.
explosive
nuclear
or
weapons
nuclear

Two aspects of this statement are noteworthy. First, in light of
the fact that possible concealment of undeclared nuclear material
was the Agency's chief concern in the DPRK, the claim that "the
Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion" demonstrates that the IAEA Director General understood the term
"diversion" to refer to concealment of undeclared nuclear material,

as well as diversion of declared nuclear material. Second, implicit
in the statement that the DPRK is in noncompliance "because it

continues to deny access"' 37 is the premise that the DPRK's failure
to grant the IAEA access to those locations itself constituted noncompliance. In other words, once the Board determined that
IAEA access to the specified locations was "essential and urgent,"
the DPRK had no legal right to refuse or limit access to the designated sites. 38
After reviewing the Director General's report, the IAEA Board

adopted a resolution on April 1, 1993, which found that the DPRK
was not complying with its safeguards obligations and that the

Agency was unable to verify the nondiversion of nuclear material.139 Thus, the Board affirmed the Director General's view that

verification of "nondiversion" applies to nonconcealment of
136. DPRK Report, supra note 123, at 10. The Director General also reported that the
DPRK had failed to comply with its general obligation under article 3 to facilitate the
implementation of safeguards and with its specific obligation under article 71 to permit the
access necessary for ad hoc inspections. Id. This Article is concerned primarily with the
finding that the DPRK violated its obligations related to special inspections under articles
18, 73 and 77.
137. Id.
138. One might argue that the Director General's statement supports a claim that the
DPRK has no legal right to refuse access, but it does not support the broader claim that the
DPRK has no legal right to limit access. Recall, however, that one of the sites to which
access was requested was specifically the below-ground level of a particular building within
a large nuclear complex. See supra note 131. The Director General's statement implies
that the DPRK has no legal right to deny access to that particular space inside that one
building. If this is correct, it follows that the IAEA Board has the authority to determine
that it is essential and urgent to gain access to any particular space inside any particular
building and that the DPRK has no legal right to deny access to any space so designated.
This is tantamount to a claim that the DPRK has no legal right to limit access within a
particular site. See supra notes 93 and 99 and accompanying text.
139. Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the Resolution Adopted
by the Board on 25 February 1993 (GOV/2636) and of the Agreement Between the
Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards
in Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/
403), IAEA Doc. GOV/2645 (Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in DPRK Report, supra note 123,
Annex 1, at 14.
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undeclared material as well as to nondiversion of declared
material.
The Board resolution called upon the DPRK "to remedy forth-

with its non-compliance, including by granting without further
delay access to specific additional information and to two locations

as set out in the Director General's request to the DPRK of 9 February 1993." 140 By affirming explicitly the Director General's finding of noncompliance and by stating that "further access" was
needed to remedy that noncompliance, the Board implicitly
endorsed the Director General's legal interpretation-i.e., that the

DPRK had no legal right to refuse or limit access to the designated
sites.
The Board decided to report the DPRK's noncompliance and

the Agency's inability to verify nondiversion "to all Members of
the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of

the United Nations. ' '1 4' After considering the matter for several
weeks, the Security Council adopted a resolution on May 11, 1993,

in which it called upon the DPRK to comply with its safeguards
agreement, requested the Director General to continue to consult

with the DPRK in an effort to resolve the issue, and encouraged
member states to facilitate a solution.142 In June, following bilat-

eral discussions between the United States and the DPRK, the
DPRK announced that it had decided "to suspend as long as it
considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal" from the
NPT. 43 For the remainder of 1993, the stalemate continued. 14
140. Id. at 15. North Korea argued that the NPT does not permit inspection of nonnuclear, military sites. See supra note 42. Yet, in its April 1 resolution, the IAEA Board of
Governors insisted upon IAEA access to sites that the DPRK had explicitly characterized
as non-nuclear, military sites. Supra note 139, at 15. This demonstrates that the IAEA
Board of Governors interprets the NFT to permit IAEA inspection of non-nuclear,
military sites, at least in some cases. The NPT parties, as a group, have not explicitly
adopted an agreed interpretation of the NPT in this respect. However, in light of the role
that the NFT itself assigns to the IAEA Board of Governors, see supra notes 23-39 and
accompanying text, the IAEA Board's interpretation of the NPT is arguably an
authoritative Treaty interpretation, binding upon all NPT Parties.
141. See supra note 139, at 15.
142. S.C. Res. 825, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3212th mtg., U.N. Doe. SIRES/825 (1993).
143. Joint Statement Following U.S.-North Korea Meeting, U.S. Dep't of State
Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 24, at 440 (June 14, 1993).
144. For a detailed description of the ongoing stalemate, see Report Dated 16
September 1993 by the Director General on the Implementation of the Agreement
Between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reprinted in Note by the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, Appendix, U.N. Doe. Mi26456 (Sept. 17, 1993).
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C. Resolution of the DPRK Nuclear Issue in 1994
During the last half of 1993, and throughout most of 1994, the
U.N. Security Council monitored developments but declined to
impose sanctions.'45 Attempts to resolve the North Korean
nuclear issue proceeded along two distinct tracks: consultations
between the IAEA and the DPRK, and consultations between the
United States and the DPRK.146 Given the DPRK's steadfast
refusal to accept inspections of undeclared locations and the Security Council's reluctance to impose sanctions, United States negotiators sought to develop a package agreement with sufficient positive
incentives to induce the DPRK to accept inspections of undeclared
sites and renounce unequivocally any nuclear weapons ambitions.147 Meanwhile, the IAEA, without relinquishing its right to
conduct special inspections of undeclared locations, focused priespecially the reprocesmarily on inspections of declared locations,
48
sing plant and the 5 MW(e) reactor.

On October 21, 1994, the United States and the DPRK signed a
bilateral agreement that established a framework to resolve the
North Korean nuclear issue.' 49 The Agreed Framework provided
145. The Security Council's inaction in this regard is attributable primarily to the view
held by China that sanctions would be counterproductive and that the problem could best
be resolved through dialogue rather than confrontation. Patrick E. Tyler, China Tells Why
It Opposes Korea Sanctions, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1994, at A5; see also Paul Lewis, U.S.
Offers a Plan for U.N. Sanctions on North Koreans, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1994, at Al.
146. In addition, South Korea maintained an intermittent bilateral dialogue with the
DPRK. See Andrew Pollack, South Korea Sees North's Move as Helpful, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 14, 1994, § 1, at 18.
147. For a description of the U.S. strategy in negotiations with North Korea, see Robert
Gallucci, Remarks at the Council for Strategic and International Studies Conference on
North Korea, (June 29, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
148. In March and June of 1994, the IAEA Board passed two additional resolutions
finding further DPRK noncompliance with its safeguards obligations. Implementation of
the Agreement Between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for
the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403), reprinted in IAEA Board of Governors Holds Meeting
on Inspections in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), IAEA Press
Release PR 94/9 (Mar. 21, 1994); Implementation of the Agreement Between the Agency
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403),
reprinted in Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Note by the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Enclosure, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/49/173 (S/1994/702) (June
13, 1994). Both resolutions found DPRK noncompliance not on the basis of refusal to
permit inspection activities at undeclared locations, but rather on the basis of refusal to
permit inspection activities at declared locations.
149. Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, October 21, 1994, reprinted in Arms Control Today, Dec.
1994, at 19 [hereinafter Agreed Framework].
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for a series of steps designed to bring the DPRK into full compliance with its NPT obligations. The first step was for the DPRK to

"freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities." 150
The freeze was to be "fully implemented within one month" after

signature of the Agreed Framework. 51 During the one-month

period "and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and
the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose." 152 Pursuant to the freeze, the DPRK agreed not to restart

its 5 MW(e) reactor, to continue to store spent fuel from that reactor pending an agreement on an appropriate means for its disposal,

not to operate its reprocessing plant, and to halt construction of
two

larger

1

construction.

graphite-moderated

53

reactors

currently

under

The Agreed Framework further provided that, after the DPRK
implemented the freeze and the IAEA had commenced monitoring the freeze, the United States would begin deliveries of "heavy
oil for heating and electricity production." 54 Deliveries of oil were
intended to compensate the DPRK for the electricity production it
is foregoing by halting operation of its 5 MW(e) reactor,15 5 an
undertaking that goes beyond its NPT obligations. Meanwhile, the
United States agreed to "organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply" light-water reactor
(LWR) power plants to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated
reactors.156 The NPT does not prohibit the DPRK from operating
graphite-moderated reactors.1s7 Even so, the DPRK agreed to
150. Id. art. I, para. 3.
151. Id.
152. Id. As of this writing, the IAEA appears to be satisfied that the DPRK is abiding
by its "freeze" commitment.
153. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Fact Sheet on the U.S.Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework, October 21, 1994, at 2 (on file
wiih author) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
154. Agreed Framework, supra note 149, art. I, para. 2. In accordance with the Agreed
Framework, oil deliveries began in early 1995. R Jeffrey Smith. Clinton Slightly Lowers
Some Bars to U.S. Trade with North Korea, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1995, at All.
155. Agr eed Framework, supra note 149, art I., para. 2.
156. Id. art. I, para. 1.
157. Indeed, the NFP states that "[n]othing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." NPT, supra note 1, art. IV,
para. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 489,729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73. Moreover, "[a]ll the Parties to the Treaty
undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy." Id. This NPT language reflects the basic bargain between nuclear and
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replace those reactors with LWRs, in part because LWRs "are

more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors.' 1 58 The United States also agreed to "make best
efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract" for the LWR
power plants within six months after signature of the Agreed
Framework.159 The agreement provided that, once the supply contract was completed, ad hoc and routine inspections [would]
resume 60under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the
IAEA."1

The provisions for a freeze, together with IAEA monitoring of
that freeze and resumption of ad hoc and routine inspections, effectively address concerns about future plutonium production and
about diversion of currently stored spent reactor fuel for nuclear
explosive purposes.' 6 1 The issue that triggered the IAEA's special
inspection request in the first place, however, remains: concern

that the DPRK may already have a stock of separated plutonium
that it has not declared to the IAEA. The Agreed Framework
deals with this issue as follows:

When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components,

the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403),
non-nuclear states embodied in the NPT. The non-nuclear-weapon states promise not to
develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the nuclear-weapon states promising to assist the
non-nuclear-weapon states in developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Id.
arts. II, IV; see 2 Shaker, supra note 28, at 274-79.
158. Fact Sheet, supra note 153, at 3. The Fact Sheet explains that "the kind of
plutonium in spent LWR fuel is much less useful in fabricating nuclear weapons, and
because LWRs must shut down to refuel, non-diversion of LWR nuclear fuel can be
verified more easily." Id. at 3.
159. Agreed Framework, supra note 149, art. I., para. 1. In fact, the six-month deadline
was not met, due to North Korea's reluctance to accept light-water reactors from South
Korea. See, e.g., North Korea Rejects Reactor Deal; U.S. Demand that South Korea Be
Supplier Stalls Pact, Officials Say, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1995, at A14. However, on June 13,
1995, North Korea finally agreed to accept South Korean reactors, thus removing a major
obstacle to completion of the supply contract. See Andrew Pollack, U.S. and North Korea
Agree on Deal for Nuclear Reactors, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1995, at Al; Andrew Pollack,
North Korea to Get Plants from Rival, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1995, at A5.
160. Agreed Framework, supra note 149, art. IV, para. 2.
161. Broadly speaking, there are three potential sources of plutonium for use in a
possible North Korean nuclear weapon: 1) plutonium derived from future reactor
operations, 2) plutonium already produced in nuclear reactors that is currently being
stored in the form of spent fuel rods, and 3) plutonium previously produced in nuclear
reactors that may have been removed from spent fuel rods. By monitoring the freeze, the
IAEA can have a high degree of confidence that it could detect diversion of plutonium in
the first two categories for use in nuclear weapons. Fact Sheet, supra note 153, at 2.
HeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 872 1994-1995

1995]

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary
by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency
with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of
the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the
DPRK. 162
Two points are especially noteworthy in this provision. First, by
specifying that DPRK compliance with its safeguards agreement
includes "taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the
IAEA," this provision constitutes acceptance by the DPRK that it
is legally obligated under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA
to take whatever actions the IAEA Board considers necessary to
verify non-diversion. This includes granting IAEA inspectors
access to any undeclared sites designated by the IAEA Board for
this purpose. Second, by referring not only to the "accuracy" but
also to the "completeness" of the DPRK's initial report, the
Agreed Framework recognizes and affirms that the scope of the
IAEA's right to verify nondiversion extends not only to verifying
nondiversion of declared nuclear material, but also to verifying
that NPT non-nuclear-weapon states have not concealed
undeclared nuclear material.
D. Assessment
The chief lesson to be drawn from the preceding account of
IAEA safeguards implementation in the DPRK is that the IAEA
has very broad investigative powers but few enforcement powers.
In North Korea, the IAEA applied its full investigative authority
by demanding a special inspection of undeclared sites and finding
noncompliance when the DPRK refused to grant access to those
sites. When the DPRK continued to refuse, however, the IAEA
had to turn to the U.N. Security Council for enforcement.
- The Security Council's unwillingness to impose sanctions on
North Korea forced adoption of a carrot approach, rather than a
stick approach. That carrot approach was less than wholly satisfactory for two reasons: First, the IAEA has been forced to accept a
delay, probably for several years, in implementing special inspec162. Agreed Framework, supra note 149, art IV., para. 3. The language about taking

"all steps ... necessary... to verify[ ]the completeness of the report" is meant to enable

the IAEA to resolve concerns about a possible existing stock of separated plutonium. Fact
Sheet, supra note 153, at 2-3.
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tions in the DPRK; 163 Second, the Agreed Framework sets a wor-

risome precedent for other potential nuclear proliferators.
Countries such as Iran will no doubt observe that North Korea's

breach of its NPT obligations ultimately led to a United States
commitment to assist the DPRK in obtaining light-water reactors.
Hence, such countries might decide that violation of their NPT
obligations is the best way to obtain future nuclear cooperation
with the United States.

On the other hand, the positive effects of the resolution of the
North Korean nuclear issue, as embodied in the Agreed Frame-

work, should not be overlooked. For example, it is possible that a
stick approach might have led to war on the Korean peninsula,

which would have been far worse than the outcome achieved in the
Agreed Framework. 164 Additionally, if the Agreed Framework is
fully implemented, it will enable the IAEA to verify with reasonable confidence that North Korea has abandoned whatever nuclear
weapons program it may have had. Finally, IAEA Board resolutions and the Agreed Framework affirm the IAEA's broad authority to conduct whatever investigative activities the IAEA Board
deems necessary to verify that there has been no concealment of
undeclared nuclear material or diversion of declared nuclear
material.
Thus, despite its lack of enforcement authority, it is clear that the
IAEA's broad investigative authority strengthened the hands of

163. There is arguably a political cost to the IAEA in deferring implementation of
special inspections in the DPRK. However, it is important to note that, from a technical
standpoint, that delay is not very significant. Assume that the IAEA is correct and that the
two suspect sites contain some form of nuclear waste. The IAEA's hope is that scientific
analysis of the nuclear waste will enable the IAEA to draw conclusions about how much
plutonium North Korea removed from spent fuel rods before the freeze went into effect.
The degree of confidence with which the IAEA will be able to draw such conclusions
depends upon the actual chemical and isotopic composition of those wastes. Normal
radioactive decay processes will alter the composition of the wastes over time, but the
changes that result from radioactive decay over the next several years will not affect the
degree of confidence with which the IAEA can draw conclusions about North Korea's past
plutonium separation activities. Fact Sheet, supra note 153, at 3 ("While [the IAEAI
would prefer to have [special inspections] conducted earlier, there is no technical
disadvantage or disk in delaying inspections of the two radioactive waste sites."). NEW
CITE. Thus, as long as the suspect sites remain undisturbed, the IAEA will not lose any
relevant information in the interim.
164. For a contrary view, see Kathleen C. Bailey, North Korea: Enough Carrots, Time
for the Stick, 13 Comp. Strategy 277 (1994). Dr. Bailey acknowledges that use of sticks,
rather than carrots, might lead to war on the Korean peninsula but argues for a stick
approach despite that risk. Id. at 281. Her article was published prior to completion of the
Agreed Framework, so its effect on her evaluation of the relative merits of the carrot
versus the stick approaches is uncertain.
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both IAEA and U.S. negotiators in dealing with the DPRK. With
a weaker hand, it is unlikely that U.S. negotiators could have pro-

duced an agreement as favorable as that embodied in the Agreed
Framework.
IV.

COMPARISON TO OTHER ARMs CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Critics of the IAEA safeguards system point to other arms control agreements that allegedly give inspectors the type of authority
they believe the IAEA is lacking. For example, one commentator
has said that "[a]t the time the NPT model safeguards agreement

was written, intrusive verification measures were politically unacceptable ....The CWC, in contrast, was completed at a time of
heightened receptivity to the potential gains from the application
of international law ....
"165 In fact, the IAEA's legal authority to
inspect undeclared sites under INFCIRC/153-type safeguards
agreements is, in certain respects, more far-reaching than inspectors' legal authority to inspect1 66
undeclared sites under any other

major arms control agreement.

The following section compares NPT safeguards with provisions
for inspection of undeclared sites in the INF Treaty,167 the START
Treaty,'68 the CFE Treaty' 69 and the Chemical Weapons Conven165. Stem, supra note 15, at 32.
166. Initially, this assertion may seem counter-intuitive, because it is generally assumed
that, since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have become more open
to intrusive inspection arrangements, and that therefore post-Cold War arms control
agreements contain more intrusive inspection provisions than did Cold War arms control
agreements, such as the NPT. However, this line of reasoning overlooks the fact that the
NPT is the only major arms control agreement to which the United States and Russia are
parties that immunizes them from on-site inspection requirements. NPT inspection
requirements apply only to non-nuclear-weapon states. NPT, supra note 1, art. III.
Because the United States and Russia are nuclear-weapon states, they are not subject to
the inspection requirements of NPT article III. Hence, superpower concerns about
limiting the intrusiveness of inspections in the United States and Russia (which have had a
powerful influence in shaping the on-site inspection provisions of other arms control
agreements) are not applicable in the NPT contexL
167. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
Dec. 8,1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Treaty Doc. No. 11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter
INF Treaty].
168. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Treaty Doc. No. 20, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter START
Treaty].
169. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No.
8, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter CFE Treaty].
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tion (CWC), 17 0 and inspections in Iraq under U.N. Security Council
resolutions.' 7 1 The comparison of these documents will focus on
consideration of four key factors: the right to inspect undeclared
sites on short notice; 72 the right to inspect undeclared sites without
any evidentiary threshold; 173 the inspected state's right to deny or
limit inspectors' access to undeclared sites; and the authority
of
174
international organizations to make compliance judgments.
A.

75
Bilateral U.S.-Soviet Treaties. INF and START1

Critics of the IAEA often focus their criticism on the fact that
INFCIRC/153 makes no explicit provision for short-notice inspections. They point to the short-notice ifispection provisions in the
INF and START Treaties as examples of inspection provisions
which could strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. 176 Both the
INF 177 and START17 8 Treaties provide for inspections of declared
170. CWC, supra note 22.
171. Resolution 687, supra note 7; S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004 mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (1991) [hereinafter Resolution 707]; S.C. Res. 715, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., 3012th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (1991).
172. Treaties that provide for short-notice inspections obligate the inspected state to
grant inspectors access to a site within a specified time period, usually measured in hours,
after being notified that the inspectors wish to inspect that site.
173. The term "evidentiary threshold" refers to the requirement, present in some on-site
inspection regimes, that a state party or international organization that requests an
inspection of an undeclared site must produce some evidence of possible noncompliance to
justify such a request.
174. Theoretically, one could construct a verification regime that invested an
international body with substantial authority to make compliance judgments and that
permitted inspections of undeclared sites on short notice, without any evidentiary
threshold and without granting the inspected state a right to deny or limit access. Such a
regime would infringe national sovereignty substantially for the sake of providing greater
assurance that states are complying with their treaty obligations. Conversely, one could
construct a regime that gave an international body little or no authority to make
compliance judgments, set a high evidentiary threshold, permitted states to limit or deny
access, and did not provide for short notice inspections. Such a regime would provide less
assurance that states were complying with their treaty obligations but would offer greater
protection for national sovereignty. By varying the mix of these four factors, one could
structure a regime to give more or less emphasis to the conflicting goals of protecting
national sovereignty versus providing greater assurance of treaty compliance.
175. Because both INF and START were negotiated prior to the breakup of the Soviet
Union, both were originally bilateral treaties. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the treaties have become multilateral. However, the multilateralization of the
treaties has not affected the inspection provisions at issue here.
176. See, e.g., Patrick Glynn, Bombs Away: The Nuclear Proliferation Boom, New
Republic, Oct. 28, 1991, at 13 (identifying the failure in detecting Iraq's development of
nuclear power as evidence of the NPT's weaknesses).
177. See INF Treaty, supra note 167, Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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sites in which the inspected party is obligated to provide the
inspecting party access to the site within nine hours after the

inspection team designates the site to be inspected. INFCIRC/153
has no comparable provisions. However, neither the INF nor the

START Treaty grants inspectors any right to inspect undeclared
sites. 179
Early drafts of both the INF and START Treaties would have

granted inspectors the right to conduct short-notice inspections of
undeclared sites. These provisions were ultimately deleted, in part

because of the United States' concern that Soviet inspectors might
abuse such a right by seeking access to sensitive U.S. military

installations for reasons unrelated to treaty verification.180 In theory, that concern could have been addressed by granting the

inspected party a right to refuse inspections of undeclared sites.
However, the parties ultimately decided that it was preferable not
to have any provision for inspecting undeclared sites, rather than

including a provision granting the inspected party an absolute right
of refusal.'""
B.

The CFE Treaty

The CFE Treaty is a multilateral treaty among states which, at
the time the treaty was negotiated, comprised all members of the
NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact.' s 2 It provides for deep

reductions in tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat airon the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, S. Treaty
Doe. No. 11, at 164, 171 [hereinafter INF Inspection Protocol].
178. See START Treaty, supra note 168, Protocol on Inspections and Continuous
Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, S. Treaty Doc. 20, at 102, 133 [hereinafter START Inspection Protocol].
179. The START Treaty does provide for "suspect-site inspections." START Treaty.
supra note 168, art. XI, para. 5. However, so-called "suspect-site inspections" are
permitted only at a small number of declared sites. See START Inspection Protocol, supra
note 178, art. VIII, paras. 2-3,
180. Another key factor was that both INF and START are designed to facilitate
monitoring of undeclared sites and undeclared activities by "national technical means of
verification," INF Treaty, supra note 167, art. XII; START Treaty, supra note 168, arts. IX,
X, XII, a euphemism for gathering intelligence by use of spy satellites. In a verification
regime that relies primarily on national technical means, the right to inspect undeclared
sites is less important than it is in a verification regime, like the NPT, that relies primarily
on on-site inspection.
181. For an insightful account of the internal conflicts within the U.S. government
between proponents and opponents of intrusive, suspect-site inspections, see Bunn, Arms
Control by Committee, supra note 46, at 159-62.
182. CFE, supra note 169, at 223.
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craft and combat helicopters in Europe. In contrast to START and
INF, the CFE Treaty does provide for short-notice, challenge
inspections of undeclared locations.8 3 Moreover, the CFE Treaty
does not establish any evidentiary threshold for requesting a challenge inspection. In other words, the inspecting party may request
a challenge inspection without producing any evidence of suspicious activities by the inspected party. This highlights another criticism that has been levelled at the IAEA: INFCIRC/153 requires
some evidence of suspicious activities before the IAEA can request
a special inspection.184
Although CFE provides for short-notice, challenge inspections
without any evidentiary threshold, it also grants the inspected party
an absolute right to refuse challenge inspections of undeclared
locations. 85 The only caveat on the inspected party's right of
refusal is that the inspected party must "provide all reasonable
assurance that the specified area does not contain conventional
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 1 86 The
inspected party's right of refusal largely eviscerates the CFE challenge inspection provisions. As with START and INF, the right of
refusal was considered essential to protect against possible compromise of information at sensitive military installations.
If the inspecting party remains dissatisfied with assurances provided by the inspected party, then the inspecting party has a right
to raise the issue in the Joint Consultative Group, a body created
by the treaty to address compliance concerns. 187 All parties to the
CFE Treaty participate in the Joint Consultative Group, and the
Group operates by consensus.'88 The requirement for consensus
makes it a practical certainty that the Joint Consultative Group will
never find any party to the treaty to be in noncompliance with its
treaty obligations because no state can be expected to consent to
183. See CFE, supra note 169, Protocol on Inspection, sec. VIII, para. 1, S. reaty Doc.
8, at 302, 322. [hereinafter CFE Inspection Protocol]. In CFE jargon, undeclared locations
are referred to as "specified areas."
184. This, at least, is the Director General's interpretation of INFCIRC1153. See Blix
testimony, supra note 98, at 11-12. Consistent with this interpretation, paragraph 73 of
INFCIRC/153 provides that the IAEA may request a special inspection "[i]f the Agency
considers that information made available by the State... is not adequate for the Agency
to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement." INFCIRC/153, supra note 9, para. 73.
185. CFE Inspection Protocol, supra note 183, sec. VIII., para. 4, S.Treaty Doc. 8, at
322.
186. Id., sec. VIII, para. 9.
187. CFE Treaty, supra note 169, art. XVI, paras. 2-3, at 241.
188. Id. art. XVI, para. 4.
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such a finding. Hence, the Joint Consultative Group lacks the real
authority to make compliance judgments that is vested in the
IAEA Board of Governors under the NPT.
C. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The CWC is similar to the NPT in two important respects: First,
like the NPT (but unlike START, INF or CFE) all states are eligible to join the CWC 8s 9 Second, whereas START, INF and CFE all
provide for inspections to be conducted by representatives of
national governments, the CWC, like the NPT, provides for inspections by international civil servants. 190 Four key factors distinguish
the CWC from the NPT: the right to conduct short-notice inspections, the evidentiary threshold for initiating an inspection of an
undeclared site, the right to limit access, and the authority to make
compliance judgments.
1. Short-Notice Inspections
One advantage of the CWC is that it expressly provides for
short-notice, challenge inspections of undeclared locations, 191
whereas INFCIRC/153 does not mandate a timeline for conduct of
special inspections. Nuclear verification experts disagree about the
practical importance of a short-notice requirement for the purposes of NPT verification. As a general rule, whenever a country
produces or processes nuclear material, it leaves behind tell-tale
traces that can be detected for many years thereafter. Hence, a
short-notice requirement is generally not very important if one's
9
goal is to detect production or processing of nuclear material.' 2
However, there may well be some special cases in which the IAEA
could benefit from a right to conduct short-notice inspections of
undeclared locations. 193
189. CWC, supra note 22, arts. XVIII, XX, at 322-23.
190. Article VIII of the CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Id. art. VIII. Inspections under the CWC are to be

conducted by OPCW staff members. See Id., Annex on Implementation and Verification,
pt. 1I(A), S. Treaty Doc. 21, at 332, 344-45 [hereinafter CWC Verification Annex).
191. CWC, supra note 22, art. IX, S. Treaty Doc. 21, at 309-13; CWC Verification
Annex, supra note 190, pt. X, S. Treaty Doc. 21, at 428-39.
192. IAEA Director General Blix has said that, in his view, time is generally not of the
essence in searching for evidence of possible diversions of nuclear material. See Blix
testimony, supra note 98, at 13.
193. In June 1995, the IAEA Board of Governors "approved an initial set of measures
that will allow its inspectors in countries suspected of developing nuclear weapons... to
mount inspections with little or no notice." Christopher S. Wren, Making it Easier to
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Evidentiary Threshold

Under the CWC, a state party requesting a challenge inspection
must "provide in the inspection request all appropriate information
on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-

compliance with this Convention.

'' 194

Thus, the CWC, like the

1 95

NPT,
permits inspections of undeclared sites only if there is
1 96
some evidence of possible noncompliance.
However, that evidentiary threshold is easier to satisfy under the
CWC than it is under the NPT. Under the CWC, inspections of
undeclared sites are initiated by state parties, not by an international organization. Requests for challenge inspections are provided to the Executive Council (the CWC analogue of the IAEA
Board of Governors), and the Executive Council may decide not to
carry out the challenge inspection only "if it considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of
this Convention.' 1 97 Thus, under the CWC, there is a strong presumption in favor of conducting requested challenge inspections.
Uncover Nuclear Arms, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1995, at A6. Prior to the June Board of
Governors meeting, the IAEA Secretariat submitted to the Board two sets of measures for
its consideration: one set "which could, in the Secretariat's view, be implemented under
existing legal authority"; and one set "which the Secretariat proposes for implementation
on the basis of complementary authority to be granted." 1995 Director General's Report,
supra note 109, at 4. The first set includes "no-notice inspections" at "strategic points;"
The second set includes no-notice inspections at other declared locations. Strengthening
the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System: Proposals for a
Strengthened and More Efficient Safeguards System: A Report by the Director General,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2807, at 6, 12-14,23 (May 12, 1995), reprinted in 1995 Director General's
Report, supra note 109, Annex 4 [hereinafter Annex to 1995 Director's General Report].
At its June meeting, the Board "[took] note of the Director General's plan to implement at
an early date" those measures that could be implemented under existing legal authority.
1995 Director General's Report, supra note 109, at 4. As of August, 1995, the IAEA was
still working on "a draft legal instrument for granting the complementary authority"
needed for implementation of additional measures. Id. at 5. The 1995 Director General's
Report does not include any proposals for short-notice inspections at undeclared locations,
although it does provide for an expanded list of declared locations. Annex to 1995
Director General's Report, supra, 8-11, 19-21.
194. CWC, supra note 22, art. IX, para. 9, at 311; see also CWC Verification Annex,
supra note 190, pt. X, para 4, at 428-29.
195. Although the IAEA must satisfy an evidentiary threshold to initiate a special
inspection request under INFCIRC0153, the IAEA has worked out informal, nonbinding
arrangements with some states that permit inspections of undeclared sites without any
evidentiary threshold. 1994 Director General's report, supra note 109, at 6 (referring to
"voluntary offers by some governments to accept Agency visits 'any time, any place' ").
196. In contrast, U.N. Security Council resolutions permit inspections of undeclared
sites in Iraq without any evidence of noncompliance. See infra notes 219-32 and
accompanying text.
197. CWC, supra note 22, art. IX, para. 17, at 312.
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This presumption is important because requests for challenge
inspections are likely to be based upon national intelligence information, and states may be reluctant to divulge too much information to the Executive Council. 198
In contrast, under the NFT, a state cannot itself initiate a request
for a special inspection. Rather, if a state has information suggesting that a special inspection is warranted, it must persuade the
Director General to request a special inspection.'9 This requirement raises sensitivities about sharing intelligence information with
the IAEA. If the IAEA requests a special inspection and the state
refuses to cooperate, the IAEA may not demand access unless it
persuades the Board of Governors that the need for action is
"essential and urgent. ' 20 0 Whereas the CWC places the burden of
proof on those who oppose a challenge inspection to convince
others that the request is "frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the
scope of this Convention,"2' 1 the NPT places the burden of proof
on those favoring a special inspection to persuade others that the
need for action is "essential and urgent." In cases where the
request for a special inspection is based upon sensitive intelligence
information, the NPT burden of proof may be difficult to satisfy.
3. Right to Limit Access
Although the inspected party may not deny inspectors access
under the CWC, to the perimeter of a site designated for challenge
inspection. However, access within the perimeter is governed by
so-called "managed access" provisions.20 2 This means that "[t]he
extent and nature of access to a particular place or places within
these perimeters shall be negotiated between the inspection team
and the inspected State Party on a managed access basis." 20 3 The
inspected party has explicit rights to limit inspectors' access to
"protect sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential information,"'2 04 "protect national security, ' 20 5 and satisfy "any
constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary
198. For further elaboration of this point, see Stem, supra note 15, at 37-38.
199. This is because INFCIRC/153 provides for special inspections only "[i]f
the Agency
considers that information made available by the State ...is not adequate for the Agency

to fulfil its responsibilities." INFCIRC153, supra note 9, para. 73 (emphasis added).
200. Id. para. 18.
201. CWC, supra note 22, art. IX, para. 17, at 312.
202. CWC Verification Annex, supra note 190, pt. X, para. 38 at 434.
203. Id. pt. X, para. 38.
204. Id. pt. X, para. 48.
205. Id. pt. X, para. 41.
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rights or searches and seizures. ' ' 2 06 Conversely, under the NPT,
once the IAEA Board has determined that action by the state is
"essential and urgent" to enable the Agency to verify non-diversion, the state has no such rights to limit IAEA inspectors'
207
access.
Although the inspected party has explicit rights to limit inspectors' access, it is not permitted to invoke those rights "to conceal
evasion of its obligations. ' 2 8 Moreover, it has an explicit obligation to demonstrate its compliance. "The inspected State Party
shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to the inspection
team that any object, building, structure, container or vehicle to
which the inspection team has not had full access.., is not used for
purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised in
the inspection request. 2 0 9 Even so, the CWC obligation to "make
every reasonable effort to demonstrate" compliance falls far short
of the NPT obligation to take whatever actions the IAEA Board
determines are "essential and urgent" to enable the Agency to verify nondiversion.2 1 0
There is an important relationship between the right to limit
access and the short-notice and evidentiary threshold issues discussed above. Those designing a regime for inspection of
undeclared sites must strike a balance between the risk of compromising sensitive information that is associated with a very intrusive
regime and the risk of failing to detect treaty violations that is associated with a non-intrusive regime. The CWC attempts to strike
this balance by making it relatively easy to initiate a challenge
inspection (i.e., by providing for short-notice inspections and crafting a procedure that makes the evidentiary threshold relatively
easy to satisfy) but granting states the right to limit access once the
inspection has begun. The NPT attempts to strike this balance by
making it relatively more difficult to initiate a special inspection
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 93, 99, and 138 and accompanying text.
208. C WC Verification Annex, supra note 190, pt. X, para. 41, at 435. It remains
unclear how the OPCW will determine when access has been denied for legitimate reasons
and when access has been denied to conceal evidence of noncompliance.
209. Id. pt. X, para. 49; see also CWC, supra note 22, art. IX, para. 11, at 311 ("[T]he
inspected State Party shall have... [t]he right and the obligation to make every reasonable
effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Convention .... ).
210. Despite real differences in legal obligations, the NPT and CWC regimes may be
quite similar in practice. States are likely to cooperate if they have nothing to hide, but will
not willingly allow inspectors to obtain proof of noncompliance, regardless of their legal
obligations.
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(because it does not provide for short-notice inspections and
entails procedures that make the evidentiary threshold relatively
difficult to satisfy) but granting unlimited access once the inspection has begun. A regime that made it easy to initiate an inspection of an undeclared site and provided for unlimited access would
be preferable in terms of verification but would arguably pose an
unacceptable risk of compromising sensitive information.
4. Authority to Make Compliance Judgments
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) has both a Conference of the State Parties, which
includes representatives of all parties and functions as its principal
decision-making body, and a smaller Executive Council, which
includes representatives of forty-one parties. 1 The OPCW's
Executive Council has the power to "consider" concerns regarding
compliance and may "request" a party to take measures to resolve
such concerns.2 12 However, it is the responsibility of the Conference of the State Parties to "take the necessary measures ...

to

ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy
any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention. ' 213 Thus, the OPCW's Executive Council lacks the authority
that the IAEA Board of Governors has to make findings of
noncompliance.214
Under the CWC, the Conference of the State Parties has the
authority to make a finding of noncompliance and to impose sanctions as a result.215 However, that authority is more constrained
than the IAEA Board's authority under the NPT in two respects.
First, it is administratively simpler for the IAEA to make a finding
of noncompliance under the NPT than it is for the Conference of
State Parties to make such a finding under the CWC.?1 6 Second,
211. CWC, supra note 22, art. VIII, at 299-308.
212. Id. art VIII, paras. 35-36.
213. Id. art. XII, para. 1.
214. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text for discussion of the IAEA's
authority to make compliance judgments. The OPCW Executive Council, like the IAEA
Board, does have authority to report compliance concerns to the U.N. Security Council.
CWC, supra note 22, art. VIII, para. 36, at 305-06. However, the Executive Council. in
contrast to the IAEA Board, does not have the authority to make a finding of
noncompliance. Id. art. VIII, paras. 35-36.
215. Id. art. XII.
216. This is because the IAEA Board includes representatives of only 35 states and
requires only a simple majority vote to reach a finding of noncompliance. See supra, notes
36-37 and accompanying text. In contrast, the CWC Conference of State Parties will have
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under INFCIRC/153, a state's refusal to grant access to an
undeclared site is itself a sufficient condition to warrant a Board

finding of noncompliance.2 17 In contrast, under the CWC, because

states have explicit rights to limit access during challenge inspections, a state's refusal to grant access, by itself, cannot justify a find-

ing of noncompliance. 1

In sum, the absence of a right to conduct short-notice inspections

and the more burdensome procedures for meeting the evidentiary
threshold are disadvantages for the IAEA, as compared to the

OPCW. However, those disadvantages are offset by the IAEA's
right to unlimited access during special inspections and by the
IAEA Board's authority to make compliance judgments under the
NPT.
D.

Inspections in Iraq Under Security Council Resolutions

U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, passed after Iraq had
been defeated in the Gulf War, set the formal conditions for a
cease-fire. 219 Acting under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,2 0 the
Security Council established a long list of conditions and declared

that a formal cease-fire would become effective "upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance" of those conditions.22'
One set of conditions related to concerns about Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction. Resolution 687 required Iraq to
unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of

agents and all related subsystems and components and all
more than 100 members and requires a two-thirds majority vote to reach a decision. CWC,
supra note 22, art. VIII, para. 18, at 301.
217. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
218. One way to think about this distinction between the NPT and CWC regimes is as
follows. Under the NPT, parties are "guilty until proven innocent." This is because the
IAEA does not have to produce positive evidence of diversion in order to reach a finding
of noncompliance; the state's failure to prove non-diversion is itself noncompliance. In
contrast, under the CWC, parties are apparently "innocent until proven guilty." Because
there is no explicit provision that authorizes the OPCW to reach a finding of
noncompliance solely on the basis of a state's failure to prove the absence of wrongdoing,
the best reading of the treaty provisions is that the OPCW must produce positive evidence
of wrongdoing to warrant a finding of noncompliance.
219. Resolution 687, supra note 7.
220. Id. at final preambular paragraph.
221. Id. 33.
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research, development, support and manufacturing facilities thereto;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than one
hundred and fifty kilometres and related major parts, and
repair and production facilities. 2m2
The resolution required Iraq to submit a declaration "on the locations, amounts and types" of all such items and to "agree to urgent,
on-site inspection."' ' 3 The resolution also established a Special
Commission (UNSCOM) charged with carrying out "immediate
on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations" by UNSCOM. 2 4

Resolution 687 also required Iraq to agree to the "destruction,
removal or rendering harmless" of "nuclear weapons or nuclearweapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any
research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related
to the above." 22 It required Iraq to submit a declaration of "the
locations, amounts, and types" of all such items. 6 The resolution
requested the IAEA "to carry out immediate on-site inspection of
Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations
and the
22 7
designation of any additional locations" by UNSCOM.
The Security Council passed Resolution 687 in April, 1991.
Although Iraq agreed in writing to implement fully the terms of
Resolution 687, over the next few months Iraq refused to cooperate with UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors. In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 707 in August, 19918z Resolution
707 condemned "Iraq's serious violation of a number of its obligations" under Resolution 687 "and of its undertakings to cooperate
with the Special Commission and the IAEA."
Resolution 707
also condemned
non-compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as established by the
resolution of the Board of Governors of 18 July, which
222. Id. '18.
223. Id. I 9(a).
224. Id. I 9(b)(i).
225. Id.
226. Id.

'112.
12.

227. Id. 13.
228. Resolution 707, supra note 171.
229. Id. 1 1.
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constitutes, a violation of its commitments as a party to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
of 1 July 1968.230
Resolution 707 demanded that Iraq "allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities,
equipment, records and means of tiansportation which they wish to
inspect. ' '23 1
Whereas the text of Resolution 687 left unresolved the precise
scope of UNSCOM and IAEA authority to demand unrestricted
access to undeclared sites, Resolution 707 made clear that: 1)
UNSCOM has the right to designate for inspection any site anywhere in Iraq; 2) it may do so without having to satisfy any evidentiary threshold; 3) UNSCOM and the IAEA may demand
inspection of undeclared sites on short notice; and 4) Iraq has no
right to refuse or limit inspectors' access to such sites.232 This type
of legal authority to conduct short-notice inspections of undeclared
sites, without any evidentiary threshold and without any right to
refuse or limit access, exceeds the scope of authority granted to
inspectors under any international arms control agreement. Resolutions 687 and 707 constitute such a substantial infringement of
national sovereignty that comparable provisions are unlikely to be
applied in the future, except in cases where the U.N. Security
Council invokes its authority under chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.
E. Summary
The IAEA's authority to inspect undeclared sites in NPT nonnuclear-weapon states compares favorably to inspectors' authority
under other arms control agreements. START and INF do not
have any provisions for inspection of undeclared sites. CFE has
such provisions, but they are weakened substantially by the fact
that the inspected state party has an unqualified right of refusal.
The CWC grants substantial authority to the OPCW, but the
IAEA's right of unlimited access during special inspections, combined with the Board's authority to make compliance judgments,
places the IAEA in a somewhat stronger position under the NPT
than is the OPCW under the CWC. The authority granted to
230. Id. 2.
231. Id. I 3(ii).
232. Id.
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UNSCOM and the IAEA under Security Council Resolutions 687
and 707 exceeds the IAEA's authority under the NPT. However,
Resolutions 687 and 707 constitute such a substantial infringement
of national sovereignty that comparable provisions are unlikely to
be applied in the future, except in cases where the U.N. Security
Council invokes its authority under chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.
One way to strengthen the IAEA's legal authority under the

NPT would be to permit both "challenge inspections" and "special
inspections." Provisions for "challenge inspections" should enable
such inspections to be initiated relatively easily and to be con-

ducted on short notice.

3

Given states' likely concerns about

overly intrusive inspections, such short-notice, challenge inspec-

tions would have to be subject to CWC-like restrictions on inspectors' access. 234 However, if the IAEA Board made a finding that

action was "essential and urgent," that finding would trigger the
IAEA's special inspection authority and override the inspected

state's right to limit access.
V.

PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE

IAEA's

LEGAL

AUTHORITY

The IAEA faces two major practical limitations on its ability to
take full advantage of its broad investigative authority: constraints

233. I have in mind procedures for initiating inspections that, like the CWC procedures,
differ from current IAEA procedures in two key respects: 1) states could themselves
request inspections, rather than relying on the Director General to do so; and 2) once
requested, a majority or super-majority vote in the Board of Governors would be required
to block the inspection. See supra notes 194-201 for a discussion of the differences
between the NPT and CWC regimes in this regard.
234. In the context of Program 93+2, the IAEA has considered proposals for inspections
involving "managed access for the purpose of protecting sensitive information," which
apparently are modeled on the CWC. 1994 Director General's report, supra note 109, at
19. With a couple of minor exceptions, proposals for "broad access" inspections cannot be
implemented under existing legal authority; such inspections require complementary
authority. Annex to 1995 Director General's Report, supra note 193, at 5, 22-23. The
IAEA Board has developed some informal arrangements for inspections of undeclared
sites, see supra note 195, but proposed formal arrangements for "broad access" inspections
involve only declared sites, not undeclared sites. See Annex to 1995 Director General's
Report, supra note 193, at 8-11, 19-21. As far as this author is aware, the IAEA has not
considered a measure, such as the one proposed herein, for challenge inspections of
undeclared sites.
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on access 35to information, and unavailability of enforcement
measures.
A. Access to Information

Once the IAEA receives information that a state may have concealed undeclared nuclear material or diverted declared nuclear
material, the IAEA has substantial authority to investigate. However, it is often difficult to acquire the initial hint that triggers such
an investigation. IAEA Director General Blix has highlighted the
need for such triggering information as a key practical constraint
on the IAEA's legal authority under NPT safeguards agreements. a36 Director General Blix explained that the IAEA needs
such triggering information because it does not have a right "to go
to a site regardless of whether there are any suspicions." ' There
' 7
must be "some reason to believe that something may exist. 2
Some have argued that the problem of gaining access to triggering information would be solved if the IAEA had the legal authority to conduct inspections at undeclared locations without any
evidentiary threshold. 38 As already noted, however, states have
proved unwilling to cede to inspectors under any arms control
agreement the right to conduct inspections of undeclared locations
without any evidentiary requirement and without right of
refusal.2 39 Moreover, even if states were willing to cede this
authority to the IAEA, it is very unlikely that the IAEA would
actually discover anything useful during an inspection without the
benefit of triggering information indicating where and for what to
look.
The IAEA has taken several steps to address the problem of
access to triggering information. For example, in February 1992,
the IAEA Board endorsed a proposal for states to provide design
235. The IAEA is also subject to severe financial constraints which affect the entire
safeguards system, not just the IAEA's ability to deal with suspected diversion of nuclear
material. For more on this point, see Fischer, supra note 128.
236. Director General Blix testified:
[F]or the inspection to be successful, we must have access to information about
possibly secret installations-those that have not been declared. We try to get

that through information about exports from individual countries. We try to scan
media for any clues. We also have asked member states to give us information on
the basis of their national systems.
Blix testimony, supra note 98, at 8.
237. Id. at 12.
238. See, e.g., id. at 15-19 (comments by Congressman Leach).
239. See supra notes 179-210 and accompanying text.
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information to the IAEA at the time they decide to construct a
new nuclear facility or modify an existing facility.240 In February
1993, the IAEA Board also "endorsed a reporting scheme on
imports and exports of nuclear material and exports of specified
equipment and non-nuclear material." 241 Most recently, in June
1995, the IAEA Board approved additional measures to strengthen

the safeguards system.242 The most significant of these measures,

for purposes of gaining access to triggering information, is a plan
for the IAEA to make greater use of environmental monitoring
techniques to provide early warning of clandestine nuclear
activities. 243
240. Scheinman, supra note 107, at 21. INFCIRC153 requires states to provide the
IAEA design information for new nuclear facilities "as early as possible before nuclear
material is introduced into a new facility." INFCIRC153, supra note 9. para. 42. In
practice, this generally meant that states did not provide such information to the IAEA
until 180 days before the facility was to receive nuclear material. Scheinman, supra note
107, at 21. The Board decision effectively reinterpreted the phrase "as early as possible" to
require design information at the time of a decision to construct or modify a facility, which
could be several years before the facility is ready to receive nuclear material. Thus, if a
facility incorporates design features that raise questions about the peaceful intentions of a
state's nuclear program, the IAEA will become aware of these concerns at a much earlier
stage in the construction or modification process.
241. 1994 Director General's report, supra note 109, at 1. The basic idea underlying this
so-called "universal reporting" scheme is that it will provide the IAEA a fairly complete
picture of the nuclear-related equipment and materials flowing into and out of individual
countries. The IAEA can analyze this import-export data to look for inconsistencies
between states' procurement patterns and their declarations about their nuclear activities.
For example, if a state procured a specialized piece of nuclear equipment that had no
apparent use in that state's declared nuclear program, that fact could trigger further IAEA
investigation.
242. Wren, supra note 193. See supra notes 109, 193, and 234.
243. The IAEA describes the significance of environmental monitoring as follows:
Any production or manufacturing process loses some small fraction of the process
materials to the immediate environment. ... [E]ven though great care is taken to
limit losses, they inevitably occur and migrate beyond the immediate
environment where the loss took place. Further, nuclear materials have specific
physical properties (e.g., radioactivity) that make it possible to detect and
characterize losses that may be present in the environment in only very small
quantities. This capability together with the possibility that specific signatures can
be unambiguously correlated with specific nuclear processes is why
environmental monitoring is seen as having promise with respect to the detection
of undeclared activities."
1994 Director General's report, supra note 109, at 15.
Recent IAEA field trials have been designed to test the use of environmental monitoring techniques for short-range monitoring in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. Id. at 16.
Such short-range monitoring can be useful for detecting undeclared nuclear activities at
declared sites. Annex to 1995 Director General's Report, supra note 193, at 11 ("Sampling
will ... provide increased assurance of the absence of undeclared unclear activities in
connection with safeguarded nuclear facilities . . . ."). However, for environmental monitoring to be really valuable in detecting undeclared activities at undeclared sites, the IAEA
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Even if all these reforms succeed, the IAEA will remain at least

somewhat dependent on member states to gain access to the triggering information it needs. The IAEA's ability to acquire such
triggering information faces two practical hurdles: technical limitations on the ability of IAEA member states to obtain information

about clandestine nuclear activities, 2 " and political limitations on

the willingness of those states to share such information with the
IAEA.2 45
B.

Constraints on Available Enforcement Measures
The IAEA has broad authority to conduct whatever investiga-

tive activities it deems necessary to verify that NPT non-nuclearweapon states have not concealed undeclared nuclear material or
diverted declared nuclear material. Indeed, NPT non-nuclearweapon states are legally obligated to grant the IAEA access to
undeclared sites to facilitate such investigative activities. However,
without a cognizable threat of sanctions for noncompliance, some
states may breach their obligations with impunity. Under the

existing regime, the sanctions which the IAEA can impose unilaterally are relatively few, and fairly weak. For example, the Agency

may curtail or suspend "assistance being provided by the Agency
or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment
made available to the recipient member.

' 246

In addition, the

Agency may suspend a state's rights and privileges of member-

ship. 47 These measures are unlikely to deter a state determined to
acquire nuclear weapons.
will need to develop techniques for long-range environmental monitoring. It is hoped that
field trials of short range techniques will allow the IAEA to draw "some inferences regarding the long range detection problem." Id. at 16.
244. For detailed discussion of techniques for detecting clandestine nuclear activities and
the technical limitations of various techniques, see Fainberg, supra note 11, at 20-42. See
generally U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Monitoring for
Nuclear Safeguards, OTA-BP-ISS-168, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Sept. 1995) (discussing methods of detecting covert facilities through environmental
monitoring).
245. States' concerns about sharing intelligence information with international
organizations underlie the CWC approach, in which the states themselves initiate requests
for challenge inspections rather than relying on the international organization to initiate
such a request (as is the case with the IAEA). Stern, supra note 15, at 37-38.
246. IAEA Statute, supra note 25, art. XII, para. C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107-08, 276 U.N.T.S. at
28-30.
247. Id. art. XIX, 8 U.S.T. at 1112, 276 U.N.T.S. at 38.
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The biggest stick in the Agency's arsenal is the threat of reporting noncompliance to the U.N. Security Council. 218 Ultimately, the
utility of this threat as a deterrent to diversion of nuclear material
depends upon the Security Council, not on the IAEA. To date, the
Security Council's record on sanctions for nuclear proliferators is
mixed. Iraq has been subjected to tough sanctions for several
years,2 4 9 and it remains uncertain when those sanctions will be
lifted. In contrast, North Korea has so far managed to evade
Security Council sanctions, despite repeated violations of its IAEA
safeguards obligations.250
Lack of available enforcement measures acts as a significant
practical constraint on the IAEA's broad investigative powers. As
the North Korean case illustrates, the lack of available enforcement measures is not a flaw in the Agency's safeguards system, but
rather a function of the nature of the international political system.
In an international regime where war is the ultimate enforcement
mechanism, and lesser sanctions pose the risk of war, there may
well be future cases in which, as with North Korea, the international community is unwilling to impose sanctions on nuclear
proliferators. In such cases, the IAEA can still serve an important
function by alerting the international community to the looming
danger of nuclear proliferation. Once the IAEA sounds the alarm,
however, it is the U.N. Security Council which must decide upon
the appropriate course of action.
CONCLUSION

All arms control verification regimes must strike a balance
between the need for intrusive on-site inspection provisions to provide greater assurance that states are complying with their treaty
commitments, and the demands of national sovereignty, which
limit the degree of intrusiveness states are willing to accept.
Despite widespread perceptions to the contrary, the NPT safeguards system is, in certain respects, more intrusive than any other
arms control verification regime. The NPT grants the IAEA farreaching authority to conduct whatever investigative activities the
IAEA Board deems necessary to verify that NPT non-nuclear248. In his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, IAEA Director General
Blix emphasized the need for Security Council backing if IAEA safeguards are to be
effective in deterring and detecting NPT safeguards violations. See Blix testimony, supra

note 98, at 8.
249. Resolution 687, supra note 7; Resolution 707, supra note 171.

250. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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weapon states have not concealed undeclared nuclear material or
diverted declared nuclear material. This investigative authority
includes a right to inspect undeclared sites without a right for the
inspected state to limit inspectors' access, which is unmatched by
any other arms control agreement.
After many years in which the IAEA exercised only a portion of
its full legal authority, the IAEA has recently adopted a more
assertive approach to take full advantage of the authority it has had
for over twenty years. Thus, although the system is not perfect,
and some further reforms could be useful, the NPT parties' decision at the recent Extension Conference to endorse the current
IAEA safeguards system was fully justified.
One way to strengthen the IAEA's legal authority under the
NPT would be to permit both "challenge inspections" and "special
inspections." Provisions for "challenge inspections" should enable
such inspections to be initiated relatively easily and to be conducted on short notice. Given states' likely concerns about overly
intrusive inspections, such short-notice, challenge inspections
would have to be subject to CWC-like restrictions on inspectors'
access. However, if the IAEA Board made a finding that action
was "essential and urgent," that finding would trigger the IAEA's
special inspection authority and override the inspected state's right
to limit access.
Recent IAEA reforms, including the decision to make greater
use of environmental monitoring techniques, should help provide
the IAEA early warning of clandestine nuclear activities. Even if
such reforms succeed, though, the IAEA will remain at least somewhat dependent on member states to gain access to the triggering
information it needs. There are two key constraints on the IAEA's
ability to acquire this information: technical limitations on the ability of IAEA member states to obtain information about clandestine nuclear activities, and political limitations on the willingness of
those states to share such information with the IAEA.
Aside from its role in helping to verify states' compliance with
their NPT obligations, the IAEA could also play a useful role in
verification of future arms control agreements. In particular, states
are currently working within the framework of the Conference on
Disarmament to reach rapid agreement on a comprehensive test
ban treaty. States are also working at a more deliberate pace to
reach agreement on a fissile material cut-off convention. The issue
of verification will be central to both these agreements. The
IAEA's proven track record in carrying out effectively its verificaHeinOnline -- 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 892 1994-1995
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tion responsibilities under the NPT suggests that states should seriously consider allocating to the IAEA substantial responsibilities
related to verification of these agreements as well.
Finally, the preceding analysis calls into question a key assumption related to the tactics of arms control negotiations. In recent
years, the United States arms control community has accepted as
an article of faith the proposition that the best way to obtain strong
verification measures is to include detailed verification provisions
in the treaty itself. Hence, the INF, CFE and START treaties, and
the Chemical Weapons Convention, all included detailed verification provisions. In contrast, NPT negotiators deferred consideration of detailed verification provisions until after the treaty entered
into force, and assigned the IAEA a central role in fleshing out
those details. Even so, the NPT verification regime is more robust,
in certain respects, than any other arms control treaty regime.
Therefore, in current negotiations for a comprehensive test ban
treaty and a fissile material cut-off convention, policy makers
should consider the tactic of including in the treaty only a general
statement of verification principles, and deferring negotiation of
detailed verification provisions until after the treaty is signed.
Under this approach, the IAEA could play a central role, as it has
under the NPT, in shaping the details of the verification regime.
Such an approach could greatly expedite completion of a treaty,
and might produce a verification regime that would be just as effective as a regime negotiated prior to treaty signature.
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